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CONCLUSIVENESS OF PERSONAL INJURY
SETTLEMENTS: BASIC PROBLEMS
DAN B. DOBBS*
I. FUNCTIONS OF SETTLEMENT
The Problem
This article is addressed primarily to students who are unfamiliar
with methods and difficulties of settling personal injury litigation.
It does not attempt to discuss all settlement problems, but only those
relating to the finality or conclusiveness of the settlement. Without
ramifications the problem is this: When should courts set:aside a
voluntary settlement of a personal injury claim and permit the plain-
tiff to seek a greater recovery? Or, put conversely, when should
courts permit a defendant to "buy his peace" by a voluntary settle-
ment so as to escape full liability for the actual injury inflicted?
In concrete form, the problem is presented by these facts or some
variation: Don Doop negligently drops a brick on Patty Poop's toe,
causing a painful bruise. The next day Don's adjuster sees Patty and
offers her fifty dollars for her trouble. She accepts and signs a
release--a document which has the standing of a contract2 and
which says that Patty gives up or releases any claim she may have
against Don. Later she discovers that the injury is more serious
than she thought at the time of the settlement. It may be that she
has suffered a broken toe, or it may be that the bruise does not heal,
gangrene sets in, and amputation is necessary.' Patty -feels that Don
Doop or his insurance company should pay the additional damage.
But if she tries to collect any further damages, Don (through his
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
'Typically a release provides that the claimant gives up all his claims
against the defendant, including claims for unknown injuries. The cases
cited in note 19 infra include some typical release provisions.
Technically a release might be regarded as non-contractual. It is not a
promise on the part of either party, but rather is evidence that th4 cause of
action previously held, by. the plaintiff is surrendered. , See Havinghurst,
Problems Concei'ning Settlement Agreements, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 283 (1958).
But courts usually 'speak of'releases as contracts, and so they are, for m6st-
practical purposes. There is no need in this article to distinguish releases
and covenants not to sue.
These are the facts ifi Mack v. Albee Press, Inc., 263 App. Div.- 275, 32
N.Y.S.2d 321 (1942), aff'd without opinion, 288 N.Y. 623, 42 N.E.2d 617
(1942).
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insurance company) will produce the release as a shield; and normally
it will function admirably in that capacity.
Yet there are some circumstances that will justify avoidance of
the release-for example, circumstances that permit Patty to ignore
the release and sue for her injury just as if it had never been given.
Courts will often give relief of this sort to Patty if fraud has been
practiced upon her,4 if she was subjected to undue pressure,5 if she
had no capacity to execute a legal document,' or if there was a mutual
mistake of a certain sort.' When relief is given, the whole question
of how much damages, if any, the defendant should pay is re-opened.
It is determined either by a trial or by a second settlement.
The Desirability of Settlement
Obviously, the parties to a dispute are not required to settle their
differences out of court. Thus if Don wanted to be certain that Patty
could not later assert her claim again, he could ignore the settlement
opportunities and proceed to a full scale trial-a point to be discussed
later. " But settlement out of court is desirable. If courts had to
accept all the disputes that are now being settled, a case arising today
might not be decided until long after the parties are dead. There
is simply no room in the courts. Partly for this reason, private settle-
ments today account for the termination of virtually all personal
injury cases. But voluntary settlement would be desirable even if
the court dockets were not overcrowded. It is faster, and because
trials cost money, it is cheaper both for the parties and the public.
Settlement also means that less unproductive time is used in pre-
paring and trying the issues in dispute. The parties, the witnesses,
and the jurors are free to do more useful work. Settlement causes
less emotional drain than a trial does. A trial is a good way of attain-
ing justice, but it is a very poor way of life; and the sooner disputants
can get 6n with the ordinary business of living, the better. Settle-
ment usually permits this.
The Purpose of Finality
A settlement is of little use unless it is final. Without finality,
neither the plaintiff nor the defendant will be able to project his
" Discussed in text accompanying notes 45-77 infra.
' Discussed in text accompanying notes 102-19 infra.
* Discussed in text accompanying note 109 infra.
Discussed in Part IV infra.
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future plans with any degree of accuracy. There are also other very
practical reasons that argue for finality of settlement. Foremost of
these, perhaps, is the strong suspicion that a plaintiff who assessed
his own injury and accepted money for it assessed it correctly the
first time. When he later comes into court with second thoughts,
we may be permitted to suspect that his first thoughts were either
more honest or more realistic. A similar reason for upholding
settlements is that a second effort to litigate or argue the matter may
not increase the chances that justice will be done. Witnesses' memo-
ries are clouded; or they have moved; or investigation that might
have been made was not made because of an early settlement. Settle-
ments should be as final as a civilized system of law can make them.
Disputes should not be reopened unless the price of finality is too
high.
The Dilemma
Unfortunately there are cases in which the price of finality in
settlements is too high. Where the defendant has been guilty of cer-
tain kinds of fraud in procuring the release, all agree that the settle-
ment cannot stand, and that the plaintiff must be permitted to pursue
his claim against the defendant without regard to the release.
Whether the price is also too high where the plaintiff merely makes a
bad mistake as to the seriousness of his injuries is not so clear.
What is clear is that the law is faced with a dilemma. There
are two legitimate interests involved-the defendant's rightful desire
to buy his peace and to rely on the settlement; and the plaintiff's
rightful expectation that the wrongdoer should pay just compensa-
tion for the injuries he has inflicted. The dilemma runs even
deeper. A voluntary settlement, like other contractual arrangements,
should be respected. If the plaintiff releases "all" claims, an indi-
vidualistic principle of the law which is compendiously expressed as
one favoring "freedom of contract" might demand, absent fraud,
that the plaintiff be held to his agreement. But an equally individual-
istic principle says that the wrongdoer-not society, or the victim, or
the victim's family, but the wrongdoer-should pay.' Almost all our
tort law of personal injury is based upon this principle. This we
have chosen in conscious preference to a social scheme for compensa-
8 See the discussion of Judge Frank in Hume v. Moore-McCormack Lines,
Inc., 121 F.2d 336 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 684 (1941), discussing
these principles in terms of "status" and contract.
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tion-in preference, for example, to insurance schemes or social wel-
fare payments to those injured by the tort of others. Where only
mistake and not fraud is involved, there is no reconciling these two
individualistic principles, the one that holds a plaintiff to his contract
and the other that holds a defendant to his tort. It is not surprising,
then, that on some issues concerning the finality of settlement, the
cases lie in a bed of confusion. But the cases should not be discussed
until the different forms of settlement have been examined.
II. MECHANICS OF SETTLEMENT
There are several distinct ways of terminating personal injury
disputes, and awareness of these methods is of course necessary to
their practical use. A comparison of these methods is important
here, however, because a settlement by one means may be more
"final" than a settlement by other methods.
Trial and Judgment
Although only a small percentage of personal injury claims are
actually tried, the consequences of trial and final judgment are sig-
nificant; they give a good guide to what might be done in cases of
voluntary settlement.
Suppose Patty Poop refuses the adjuster's offer to settle. She
obtains a lawyer and eventually her case is called for trial. A jury
awards her 100 dollars. The judge then enters a judgment which
says, in effect, that the defendant owes Patty 100 dollars. The de-
fendant pays it. Suppose Patty then discovers that her injury was
worse than anticipated or, that she had a different injury, unknown
to her at the time of trial. Can she then file another suit against
the defendant or re-open the old one?
The answer is usually no. The reason is res judicata-the thing
- When losses are high it is likely that the injured plaintiff will receive
benefits from other sources, such as insurance. See Morris & Paul, The
Financial Impact of Automobile Accidents, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 913, 919(1962). Some of these collateral benefits would be paid to the injured plain-
tiff whether or not the tortfeasor paid his share. There are no exact figures,
however, as to the extent of public assistance going to plaintiffs who are
unable to collect full reimbusement from the tortfeasor. Non-economic losses
ought to be evaluated here, too. For example, if. the husband, is injured
and does not recover, the wife may be required to work and there may be
a concomitant detriment to home life. See Morris & Paul, suprd at'918.
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has been adjudicated.'" However, there are two exceptions. At
common law the trial court has absolute control over its own judg-
ments within the term at which they are rendered." Thus the
judgment is not final until the term is at an end. If the term of
court is six months long and a judgment is rendered on the first day
of the term, a plaintiff who later discovers a more serious injury
might within six months apply to the trial judge to vacate the
judgment. On the other hand, if the judgment is entered on the
last day of the term, it becomes final the next day. A second excep-
tion to the rule which binds Patty to her unfortunately small judg-
ment is that equity will relieve her from some kinds of mistake. But
the mistakes of this sort are limited. They are sometimes called
extrinsic mistakes-mistakes extrinsic to the merits and of the kind
that prevent the plaintiff from getting a trial at all or a generally fair
trial.'2 For example, plaintiff mistakenly believes the trial is sched-
uled in June, but actually it is scheduled and held in May. If the
mistake is a reasonable one the plaintiff may be relieved. But mis-
takes as to the merits of the case are different, and these mistakes
are not subject to relief in equity. Thus Patty's belief that she had
a small injury is a mistake, but it is one about the merits and relief
is not justified.
Statutes have been enacted in most jurisdictions to provide relief
by vacation of the judgment in the trial court which rendered it.
The grounds given usually include mistake or discovery of "new
10 The doctrine of res judicata, when used to hold a winning plaintiff to
his judgment, is called merger. It is said that his original cause of action
is merged into the judgment and his only rights are those given in the judg-
ment itself. See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 47 (1942).
"
1 MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PER-
SPEcTIVE 385 (1952); Fraser, Reopening of Judgments by the Plaintiff, 42
IOWA L. REv. 221 (1957). This rule often holds good within term time
even though statutes regulate procedure for setting aside a judgment after the
term. Thus under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-220 (1953), a judgment may be
set aside for certain statutory grounds within one year; but within the
term, the trial judge may set aside or modify for any reason within its
discretion. See Burrell v. Dickson Transfer Co., 244 N.C. 662, 94 S.E.2d
829 (1956); Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 227 N.C. 374, 42 S.E.2d 407
(1947).
12 RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 118b, 126(2) (e) (1942); FREEMAN,
JUDGMENTS § 1246 (5th ed. 1925). A similar, but not so retrictive distinc-
tion is made about releases. The mistake must be "basic," not "collateral."
See Havinghurst, The Effect Upon Settlements of Mutual Mistake as to
Injuries, 12 DEF. L.J. 1, 3 (1963). But the restriction to a basic mistake in
releases is not so great as the restriction to an "extrinsic" mistake in judg-
ments.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
evidence" of a limited sort."3 Sometimes these statutes set up a
special time limitation-one year, for example-in which the party
seeking relief may apply. These statutes do not say what kind of
mistake is contemplated. But it is often clear that they are designed
to codify the equity action for relief mentioned above. It seems
probable, therefore, that the mistake mentioned in these statutes is
the so-called "extrinsic" mistake. If so, these statutes are of no help
to Patty, for her mistake is "intrinsic" to the merits-a part of what
was in issue. These statutes also make provision for relief when
new evidence is discovered. But there is no reason to think that the
"new evidence" for which new trial can be granted is of the kind
Patty now has. It was not in existence at all when she tried her
case. Lawyers seem to agree for they have generally not tried to
vacate plaintiff's judgments for the kind of mistake Patty made. 14
Thus, discovery of injury unknown at the time of the trial is
probably seldom or never grounds for relief. The judgment is final
except so far as the trial judge has absolute control over it during
the term time. This may occasionally be important, but in the vast
number of cases the plaintiff will not learn that his injuries were
more serious than he first thought until too late. The seemingly
harsh result is perhaps reasonable enough because plaintiffs are very
much aware of the need to prove all future medical problems and
doctors are permitted to estimate the likelihood of future pain and
suffering, future expense, and future consequences. Thus if Patty's
case is tried she will ordinarily have a physician who can testify
not only as to injuries she presently has but also as to what conse-
quences-such as gangrene-are likely. A trial therefore usually
forces two things that are important here: (1) physical examination
by a physician who knows he may have to testify; and (2) every
effort to foresee future consequences. For this reason it is not un-
fair to say that Patty is stuck with her mistake.
Suppose, however, that the defendant Doop had been guilty of
1 3E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b); N.Y. R. Civ. PRAc. 5015(a); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-220 (1953). Some apparently provide relief only for defendants.
E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 473. See Fraser, Reopening of Judgments by the
Plaintiff, 42 IowA L. REv. 221 (1957).
"But, for similar cases where lawyers have tried for plaintiff-relief
from their own favorable judgments, see Machera v. Syrmopoulos, 319 Mass.
485, 66 N.E.2d 351 (1946) ; Cain v. Quannah Light & Power Co., 131 Okla.
25, 267 Pac. 641 (1928). No relief was granted in either case, although both
involved consent judgments.
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fraud in his conduct of the law suit, as for example, by introducing
perjured testimony. When Patty discovers this, can she bring a new
suit or re-open the old one? Again the answer is no.15  Even
provable fraud does not justify setting aside the original judgment
in most instances, unless it is "extrinsic"-that is, the kind that
prevents a real trial. Perjured testimony is certainly unfair. But
it goes to the merits of the case, and cross-examination plus a jury's
judgment of credibility are the best weapons we have against it.
Even though in Patty's case we might be able to prove beyond doubt
that Doop was guilty of fraud, to permit judgments to fall on this
ground is to permit harassment of innocent defendants who would be
subjected to constant relitigation. Thus even fraud in presenting a
case on its merits is not ground for relieving Patty. 6
These rules do not apply to some administrative hearings.' Un-
der workmen's compensation statutes, the dispute is often subject to
re-opening. 8 There are several reasons for the different treatment of
these claims. One is based on policy, the protection of the injured
worker and his family. Another is that these hearings normally
are not so expensive and fully prepared as trials of personal injury
claims in courts, and the administrative handling of claims means
that a defendant is not quite so troubled by re-opening the matter
as he would be if a second jury trial were required.
Settlement by Release
The most common method of settlement is by release or covenant
not to sue. Although a covenant not to sue has important conse-
quences in some jurisdictions when joint or concurrent tort-feasors
are involved, it is, so far as finality is concerned, on the same footing
as a release. A release usually provides that the injured party (here-
after called the "plaintiff" for convenience) "releases" all his claims
" See RESTATEmENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 118-26 (1942). If a statute mentions
fraud as a ground, it presumably means the so-called "extrinsic" fraud
which was a ground for equitable relief, and not simply any fraud at all.
Some, however, explicitly extend relief to cases involving any kind of fraud.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
"o Neither can a plaintiff so situated bring an independent action in tort to
recover for the fraud or perjury. To permit this would be to permit a
collateral or indirect attack on the judgment. See, e.g., Ragsdale v. Watson,
201 F. Supp. 495 (W.D. Ark. 1962); Gillikin v. Springle, 254 N.C. 240,
118 S.E.2d 611 (1961).
"' See Developments in the Law, Res .udicata, 65 HARV. L. Rvov. 818.
865-74 (1952).
"E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-47 (1958).
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against the defendant arising from the particular transaction. Re-
leases are usually written by defendant's lawyers or insurance com-
panies and favor the defendant very strongly. Today they usually
provide that the claimant releases not only claims for known in-
juries, but also claims for unknown injuries and claims for un-
expected consequences.19 For example, Patty's broken toe was an
unknown injury and the gangrene was a "consequence" of a known
injury and both would be released-if the language of the release
is effective. Sometimes these provisions are ignored by courts and
claimants are permitted to set aside their releases. This will be dis-
cussed in more detail later.2"
If the release is valid and the claimant decides he should have
more money, in most jurisdictions he will bring an ordinary lawsuit
and allege the original negligence of the defendant. The defendant
will then plead the release as a defense. At this point the court or
jury must decide whether the release is effective or valid. 2 If it is,
the plaintiff must lose, for it is a good defense. If it is not valid, the
plaintiff must then prove the defendant's original negligence and
damages. In most instances a plaintiff will never bring such a suit;
he knows what the release said and he thinks, rightly in most cases,
that it is a bar. In a few jurisdictions the claimant who has signed
a release will not bring suit directly on his personal injury claim
but may first bring suit in equity to set aside the release.22 If he
Il Examples of release provisions may be found in many cases. See,
e.g., Hutcheson v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 576 (W.D. Ark. 1962);
Casey v. Proctor, 22 Cal. Rptr. 531 (Cal. App. 1962), rev'd, 28 Cal. Rptr. 307,
378 P.2d 579 (1963); Tattershall v. Yellow Cab Co., 225 Mo. App. 611, 37
S.W.2d 659 (1931); Mendenhall v. Vandeventer, 61 N.M. 277, 299 P.2d
457 (1956); Phillips v. Alston, 257 N.C. 255, 125 S.E.2d 580 (1962).
See Part IV infra.
21 Procedure varies. Sometimes a jury passes solely on the validity of the
release. If it is not valid, a second jury then hears the claim on the merits.
In other cases both the question of release validity and the merits of the case
are submitted at the same time to a jury. See Bowie v. Sowell, 209 F.2d
49 (4th Cir. 1953); Casey v. Proctor, 22 Cal. Rptr. 531 (Cal. App. 1962),
rev'd, 28 Cal. Rptr. 307, 378 P.2d 579 (1963) ; Ruggles v. Selby, 25 Ill. App.
2d 1, 165 N.E.2d 733 (1960); Mendenhall v. Vandeventer, 61 N.M. 277, 299
P.2d 457 (1956); Cowart v. Honeycutt, 257 N.C. 136, 125 S.E.2d 382
(1962). Of course, the facts as to validity may be so clear-at least in the
mind of the judge--that there is no jury question at all, so that summary
judgment or nonsuit may be proper. Hutcheson v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 204 F.
Supp. 576 (W.D. Ark. 1962) (summary judgment); Nogan v. Berry, 188
A.2d 116 (Del. Super. 1963) (summary judgment); Ward v. Heath, 222
N.C. 470, 24 S.E.2d 5 (1953) (nonsuit).
21 See Ruggles v. Selby, supra note 21; Wheeler v. White Rock Bottling
Co., 299 Ore. 360, 366 P.2d 527 (1961).
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succeeds on that, he may then bring a separate suit based upon the
defendant's negligence and his own injuries.
Parents' Indemnifying Releases
In many jurisdictions defendants have coped with the problem of
settling with minors by inventing a document called a "Parents' In-
demnifying Release." Since a release is treated like a contract, and
since a minor is not bound by his contract, an ordinary release would
not bar a minor's claim. He could sign it but later on repudiate it.
This does not attain the defendant's objective.
The parents' indemnifying release is designed to avoid this
problem. This release is for the minor's injuries, but it is signed
by the parent of the injured minor. The parent gives up or releases
any claims he may have personally, and he also promises that if the
minor should ever bring suit, that he, the parent, will re-pay the
defendant for any recovery the minor makes.2 3 If the claim is small
defendants often feel adequately protected by this device, since
the minor would not normally bring suit during minority except by
his parents, and they will not do so because if the minor recovers
they may subject themselves to liability under the indemnifying
release.
There are clear advantages to the indemnifying release. Parents
will seldom make a settlement unless sufficient money is paid, and
this is an economical method of settlement often desirable where the
claim is small and does not justify a lawsuit. But it is also clear that
such releases pressure parents not to act in the best interests of the
minor. If it is later determined that the minor's injuries were worse
than suspected the parents may refuse to sue for fear of liability under
the indemnity release. Courts that have reached the problem have
said that such an idemnity provision is a backdoor way of holding a
minor to his release, and have ruled that such releases violate public
policy and are invalid.24 In still other states the releases are not
used because of local belief that they are ineffective or because of
"The procedure is described in Panel, Settlement Procedures, 11 ARK.
L. REv. 54, 56 (1956); Note, U. KAN. CITY L. REv. 237 (1962). Typical
provisions are quoted in Loesch v. Vassiliades, 17 N.J.S. 306, 86 A.2d 14
(1952), and Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mallison, 223 Ore. 403, 354 P.2d 800(1960).
2" Loesch v. Vassiliades, supra note 23; Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mallison,
supra note 23; Valdimer v. Mount Vernon Hebrew Camps, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d
21, 172 N.E.2d 283 (1961). Notes, 30 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 237 (1962);
12 SYRAcUsE L. Rnv. 415 (1961); 7 UTAu L. REv. 274 (1960).
1963l
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
statutes which seem to contemplate a different procedure for settle-
ment with minors.2 5
There is certainly much wisdom in holding that a parent's in-
demnifying release is against public policy. But it is not an un-
arguable proposition. Who more than parents should be able to
approve a settlement with a minor? What the rule against in-
demnifying releases requires is that a formal-and often plirely
formal-suit be instituted so that a judge may decide whether the
proposed settlement is advisable. Absent unusual ignorance on the
part of parents, or fraud or duress, there seems to be no reason why
the parents are not equipped in most instances to make this decision.
The requirement of a court procedure for every settlement with
minors is expensive and it might be argued that the expense is too
high for the relatively limited protection given in court approved
settlements. Nevertheless, this argument has been weighed and
considered inadequate to balance the need for full protection of
minors that courts have long given.26 Perhaps the conclusion is
correct because lawyers themselves have never been disposed to regard
an indemnity release as much protection and have relied more on its
psychological value as a deterrent to further claims than its legal
value. But, for this very reason, it is possible that on small claims
that do not justify more expensive settlement procedures, lawyers
will continue to use such agreements in spite of decisions voiding
them. If such practice is in fact continued, it is difficult to see how
decisions avoiding such agreements will effectuate public policy
except in the few instances where parents rebel.2" Unless the claim-
ants themselves are aware of their rights to proceed without fear of
indemnity claims, needs of many minors may go unredressed in spite
of the liberal portective policy of these recent decisions. On the other
hand such agreements are "chancier" than they were before such
decisions and careful attorneys may well hesitate to use them.
" Thus, if a statute contemplates judicial approval of settlements with
minors, it may be inferred that settlement in any other manner is void. Cf.
Valdimer v. Mount Vernon Hebrew Camps, Inc., supra note 24.
26 Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mallison, 223 Ore. 403, 354 P.2d 800 (1960).
" Panel, supra note 23, at 56.
"8 For this reason it has been suggested that the defendant who has paid
on an infant's claim and has taken an indemnity release should not receive
credit for what he has paid if the infant later sues. Note, 12 SYRAcusE L.
RFv. 415 (1961). It is supposed that such a rule would discourage the use
of indemnity releases. Since the amounts are small and the psychological
deterrent to suit by the minor is great, it seems doubtful whether this measure
would materially assist in enforcing the policy against such agreements.
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Court Approval of M1dinors' Settlements
Where a parents' indemnifying release can not be used, and where
the defendant wants the greater certainty of a court-approved settle-
ment, he may do one of two things. He may arrange for a "friendly
suit" with ihe plantiff, in which defendant will consent to a judgment
in the amount previously agreed upon; or he may arrange to have
a guardian appointed for the minor and for court approval of a
guardian's release. The friendly suit or consent judgment procedure
goes something like this: The defendant negotiates with the parents
of the minor-claimant until a settlement is reached. When an amount
is agreed upon the defendant hires an attorney for himself and an-
other one to represent the claimant. Defendant attorney prepares
a complaint, which he furnishes the plaintiff's attorney, and it is filed.
Defendant immediately files an answer, and the parties then, as
previously agreed upon, waive a jury trial and meet more or less
informally with the judge. They inform him of the agreed settle-
ment and he satisfies himself that the settlement is a fair one, con-
sidering the probable proof of negligence, contributory negligence,
and severity of injury. This usually involves the taking of some
testimony, however informally it may be presented. When the judge
is so satisfied, he will enter a judgment finding for the plaintiff in
the amount agreed upon by the parties. Sometimes judgments of
this sort show on their face that they are "consent judgments."
Sometimes they are written to disguise this fact. In any event the
defendant's liability is now determined judicially and when the
judgment is paid he can normally feel that his liability is finally de-
termined and not any more subject to further dispute than a trial-
based determination. Thus where the minor's release would not
protect the defendant from further litigation, the consent judgment
ordinarily will.
This is a relatively expensive mode of procedure. The defendant
must have an attorney to file the answer, and an attorney must be
obtained for the plaintiff (if he does not already have one) to file
the complaint. All these costs are borne by the defendant and of
course increase the cost of settlement. This form of settlement does
have some advantages over a release. The record indicates a lawsuit
which teminates with a judgment, and a court's judgment attains a
great deal of finality indeed. In general it may be said that this sort
of judgment is more likely to end the matter completely than a
1963]
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release; it is not apt to be set aside for mistake or fraud so easily
as a release might.
But there are holes in this procedure, too. One of the reasons
why a full scale trial and final judgment is accorded great finality
is that it offers the special protections to the parties of the adversary
system. A pro forma settlement with court approval minimizes that
protection. The plaintiff's attorney in the consent judgment is usu-
ally selected and paid by the defendant. There is nothing either illegal
or unethical about this. The attorney so retained must represent the
plaintiff fully even though the defendant pays his fee. Occasionally
such attorneys have insisted on settlements higher than the original
agreement called for. This shows that plaintiffs in such a situation
can be protected by attorneys who are paid by defendant. But cer-
tainly an attorney retained by the defendant but for the plaintiff has
little inclination to stir the brew of controversy and courts may doubt
that the minor-plaintiff has been so fully protected as he would have
been in a full adversary trial with his own attorney. Thus, although
such settlements take the form of judgments, they do not acquire so
much strength against attack as a trial-based judgment, and they are
sometimes set aside upon a showing that the minor was not fully
represented, or that the judge did not make adequate inquiry into
his injuries or into the merits of the case. 9 They could also be set
aside for fraud, but mere mistake offers a poor ground for setting
aside such a judgment. Since there is enough formal protection to
indicate to the parties that a serious matter is being considered,
chances of a casual mistake are comparatively small.Y0
"Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Lasca, 79 Kan. 311, 99 Pac. 616 (1909); Rector
v. Laurel River Logging Co., 179 N.C. 59, 101 S.E. 502 (1919); Annots., 20
A.L.R. 1249 (1922), 15 A.L.R. 667 (1921). See also Smith v. Price, 253
N.C. 285, 116 S.E.2d 733 (1960), where the insurance company for one
minor used a consent judgment against that minor to settle with another
minor. When the first minor wanted to bring an action of his own he
was permitted to set aside the consent judgment against him because of the
"conflict of interest among the defendants, all [of whom] were represented
by the same attorney."
"Thus some courts have said that even a consent judgment or friendly
suit involving minors will not be set aside absent fraud. Hudson v. Thies,
35 Ill. App. 189, 182 N.E.2d 760 (1962). See also Handley v. Mortland, 54
Wash. 2d 489, 342 P.2d 612 (1959) (4 Judges dissenting). Other courts
content themselves with the observation that while failure of the trial court
to supervise the settlement properly, as by failure to ascertain the injury,
is ground for relief, mere mistake as to the seriousness of the injury of the
claimant is not. Reeves v. Runyan, 172 Ohio St. 177, 15 Ohio Op. 2d 327,
174 N.E.2d 244 (1961), affirming 15 Ohio Op. 2d 431, 168 N.E.2d 587(1961) (involving a petition for authorization to settle and not a friendly
suit).
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The problem of settling with infants may be approached in an-
other way. A petition may be filed with the appropriate court for
approval of a settlement.3" This would normally require that a
guardian be appointed for the minor and that the guardian execute
the release. Such a release would be binding, at least if the approval
was more than formal. However, where the approval of the judge
is perfunctory, and his study of the situation is inadequate, again
the minor has a right to set aside the release and sue for his in-
juries.3 1
In some states this procedure is simplified. Thus in North Caro-
line an ex parte proceeding may be brought for approval of a minor's
settlement 3 and when it is approved by the judge, the settlement so
approved becomes final when the defendant pays the money into the
office of the clerk.34 Although it would seem that the judge must
make appropriate inquiries into the minor's injuries here as well as
in the case of a consent judgment or friendly suit, this procedure
seems less cumbersome than a full guardianship proceeding.
Adult's Settlement by Consent Judgment, Dismissal or Nonsuit
Settlement with a minor involves special hazards for obvious
reasons. Settlement with an adult may be accomplished by some
of the same methods and such settlements typically involve less
danger that the settlement will later be overturned. An adult-
plaintiff may sue for his injuries and later agree with defendant
upon a settlement. When this occurs, three basic patterns of settle-
ment can be distinguished.
One. A consent judgment may be entered, much as in the case
of minors. Here, however, the plaintiff usually has his own counsel
and judicial supervision of the settlement is not necessary. The
parties may simply appear before the judge in chambers, advise him
that the case is settled, and ask him to sign a judgment, the form of
which they have agreed upon . 5  The judgment will often recite
that the amount awarded has been paid and that the judgment is
See, e.g., Hudson v. Thies, supra note 30; Reeves v. Runyan, supra
note 30.
"Reeves v. Runyan, 172 Ohio St. 177, 15 Ohio Op. 2d 327, 174 N.E.2d
244 (1961), affirming 15 Ohio Op. 2d 431, 168 N.E.2d 587 (1961). See An-
not., 8 A.L.R.2d 460 (1949).
"s N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-400 to -402 (1953).
Gillikin v. Gillikin, 252 N.C. 1, 110 S.E.2d 474 (1960).
' Statutes may simplify procedures even further. Thus N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-209 (1953), provides for entry of such judgments by the Clerk of the
Superior Court.
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"satisfied" or discharged. The appearance of such a judgment on
the records may be like that of a judgment rendered after a full trial.
Sometimes the judgment recites that the parties submitted the con-
troversy to the judge sitting as a finder of fact and recites his "find-
ings" that defendant was negligent and plaintiff injured and so on.
In other judgments of this sort there is a recital that it is ,entered
by consent of the parties.
Whatever the form, a judgment entered by consent of the parties
has both a judicial and contractual aspect. How should it be treated
-as a contract, like a release, or as a judgment like any other judg-
ment? Should we say, for example, that fraud is ground for relief
from this judgment, but only if it is extrinsic fraud, the type required
to upset a normal judgment? Or should we permit any kind of
fraud, of the sort for which a release may be set aside, as a ground
for setting aside the consent judgment? The same question applies
to mistake. Should we set aside a consent judgment for mistake only
if a normal judgment would be set aside-or may it be set aside if
a release would be set aside under the same circumstances?
The answers to these questions are undecided. Courts frequently
talk of setting aside a consent judgment for fraud or mistake, but
they do not say what kind of fraud or mistake they mean."0 Some-
times courts speak of a "mutual mistake," and that may suggest they
are thinking in contractual terms." If so, a consent judgment would
be treated like a release. At other times they seem to assume that
"°E.g., Moody v. Wike, 170 N.C. 541, 87 S.E. 350 (1915) (apparently
assuming any fraud to be sufficient); Weaver v. Hampton, 201 N.C. 798,
161 S.E. 480 (1931). In Ire S. Bushey & Sons v. W. S. Hedger Transp.
Corp., 167 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1948), the court seemed to assume that the kind
of fraud or mistake required to vacate a consent judgment was like that
required to vacate any other judgment. The court cited the Restatement of
Judgments §§ 117-26. In King v. King, 225 N.C. 639, 35 S.E.2d 893 (1945),
the court held that a mistake of the legal effect of a consent judgment did notjustify relief. In Middlesex Concrete Prods. & Excavating Corp., v. Borough,
35 N.J. Super. 226, 113 A.2d 821 (N.J. App. 1955), the defendant had agreed
to pay plaintiff-contractor periodically for construction work done on the basis
of estimates of the value of the work. Estimates were made as agreed, but the
defendant apparently disagreed and refused payment. Plaintiff then brought
suit and after further study, defendant agreed to a consent judgment which
was entered and paid. Thereafter defendant seems to have decided it was
mistaken in the amounts of the estimates. It sought to set aside the judgment.
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
set aside the judgment.
"E.g., Leggett v. Smith-Douglass Co., 257 N.C. 646, 127 S.E.2d 222
(1962); Deaver v. Jones, 114 N.C. 650 (1894); Kerchner v. McEachern, 93
N.C. 447"(1885) ; Baran v. Baran, 166 Pa. Super. 532, 72 A.2d 623 (1950).
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statutes providing for relief from judgments apply, and if so it would
seem that they are thinking of consent judgments as judgments so
that the rules requiring extrinsic fraud or mistake would apply.3"
But the fact is that the courts have not really decided this question
at all, and reasoning of this sort is not really helpful in predicting
what they would do if presented with the issue.
Perhaps it is more useful to notice two things about consent judg-
ments affecting adults. The first is that there may be a greater
tendency in the case of consent judgments to award relief than in the
case of judgments entered after trial. This is only an estimate, but
it is borne out in part by the second point, which is this: a consent
judgment usually means the same kind of careful preparation that
is given to a trial and the parties are normally represented by counsel.
Thus, much of the protection of a trial goes into most consent judg-
ments involving adults. Sometimes this is not so, and some cases
have taken note of the fact and relieved parties from consent judg-
ments which did not seem to involve the kind of extrinsic fraud or
mistake necessary to get relief from a trial-based judgment.39  No
final answer can be given, but in most respects it would seem that a
consent judgment should have the same finality as a trial-based
decision. We can probably expect the exceptions to be few and far
between.
In one respect consent judgments attain greater finality than
" This seems to be the assumption of Justice Hoke in Cox v. Boyden, 167
N.C. 320, 83 S.E. 246 (1914), referring to the predecessor of N.C. GEN-
STAT. § 1-220 (1953). Federal courts have held that FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)
applies to consent judgments. Washington v. Sterling, 90 A.2d 836 (D.C-
App. 1952), aft'd, 91 A.2d 844 (D.C. App. 1952); Fleming v. Heubsch
Laundry, 159 F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1951). But under Rule 60(b) extrinsic
fraud or mistake is not required. In Lowery v. Callahan, 210 S.C. 300, 42
S.E.2d 457 (1947), the court talked about the consent judgment first as if it
had the standing of a release and then as if it had the standing of a judgment.
" In Fleming v. Heubsch Laundry, supra note 38, the OPA advised
defendant that its practices violated regulations. Defendant was represented
by counsel, but on the strength of these representations nevertheless consented
to an adverse judgment. Later, with new counsel, he discovered that regu-
lations made his activities lawful and sought to set aside the judgment. He
was permitted to do so, partly because "we are dealing with a citizen and
his government" and partly because of the difficulty of finding OPA regula-
tions. In Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Gill, 227 F.2d 64 (4th Cir. 1955), an
ignorant administrator was appointed for the estates of his son and others
killed in an auto-train collision. An attorney was procured for him for the
purpose of instituting the administration, but the attorney did not represent
the administrator in the settlement negotiations. The administrator executed
releases and these were set aside on a finding of fraud and duress. See also
Acker v. 'Martin, 136 W. Va. 503, 68 S.E.2d 721 (1952).
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ordinary judgments based on trial. In some jurisdictions no appeals
can be had from consent judgments, and they may not be set aside
during term time in the judge's discretion as ordinary judgments
can.40 The theory for such rules is that a consent judgment is really
a contract-for this purpose-and must be set aside, if at all, only
on the grounds which permit a contract to be set aside. The rule
that denies the judge power to set aside a consent judgment in his
discretion during term time seems wrong, for it penalizes settlement-
a plaintiff would clearly be better off to insist on a trial.
Two. In some jurisdictions much the same sort of thing is ac-
complished by the plaintiff's submitting to a nonsuit by agreement,
41
and this can also become final,"2 but it perhaps does not have the
standing in practice that a fully considered judgment has. Where
a nonsuit is used it is often customary to take releases from the plain-
tiff as well, since if there is question as to the court's jurisdic-
tion the nonsuit might not be effective.
Three. In other jurisdictions there is a dismissal "with preju-
dice," meaning dismissal with prejudice to any further claim or suit.
The mechanics vary slightly. In some jurisdictions the plaintiff
simply endorses on the complaint, or docket, or both, words to the
effect that he has dismissed with prejudice, and signs it. In other
courts the practice is to petition the court for an order dismissing the
case or to file a stipulation for dismissal signed by all parties.4 3
In the first two forms, the settlement is a formal adjudication
.and in the case of dismissal with prejudice it has substantially
the same effect. In such cases, where adults are involved, the settle-
-anent is normally final and a mistake will not vitiate it even though
-the same mistake might vitiate a release.
44
The form used in completing a settlement makes a difference in
.the finality that settlement achieves. A judgment entered after a full
itrial is apt to be conclusive even though the plaintiff can prove fraud,
with rare exceptions where extrinsic fraud is involved. Settlement
'by consent judgment or voluntary dismissals are formally like full
,0 See, e.g., Cason v. Shute, 211 N.C. 195, 189 S.E. 494 (1937); Deaver
v. Jones, 114 N.C. 649, 19 S.E. 637 (1894).
" See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-209 (1953).
41 Caldwell v. Caldwell, 189 N.C. 805, 128 S.E. 329 (1925).
" See FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (a).
"Pulley v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 122 Kan. 269, 251 Pac. 1100 (1927);
cf. Mensing v. Sturgeon, 210 Iowa 918, 97 N.W.2d 145 (1959) (plaintiff,
previously a defendant, had settled-he is now barred from suing).
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adjudications; but since they also look very much like contracts,
and since the full protections of adversary procedure are not always
involved in consent judgments, courts may be willing to set aside such
judgments on the showing of simple fraud or mistake without re-
quiring the extrinsic fraud or mistake necessary to set aside a trial-
based judgment. Releases are only contractual and do not involve
any adjudication. Neither do they afford the plaintiff the protection
of adversary procedures and judicial supervision. They are, there-
fore, much more vulnerable to attack if the plantiff has mistaken his
injuries or his rights, or if the defendant's conduct in obtaining the
release is unfair.
But it is important to notice that under some circumstances,
judgments may be set aside with relative ease. During term time a
judgment can be set aside within the trial judge's discretion-even
though the plaintiff's mistake or the defendant's conduct would not
be enough to set aside a release. On the other hand, in many juris-
dictions there is a time limit beyond which a judgment may not be
set aside, even if fraud or mistake is proved, and even if it is the
kind of fraud or mistake necessary to avoid a judgment. Both of
these rules have been found useful in dealing with judgments. Both
are suggestive as to what might be done about the problem of setting
aside releases. In general, however, time limits involved in setting
aside judgments are not the primary considerations in setting aside
releases. Generally releases are set aside for fraud, duress, in-
capacity, or mistake-grounds which will now be examined in that
order.
III. AVOIDANCE OF SETTLEMENT FOR FRAUD AND MISCONDUCT
A. Fraud
Most defendants-the term here is used to include their insurance
companies and adjusters-are entirely fair in settling claims. Some-
times they are tempted to lie their way into a favorable settlement,
however, and this is particularly easy with the injured. Typical lies
inducing claimants to sign releases are that the claimant has no legal
claim,45 that the claimant is not seriously injured,46 that the release is
only a receipt for the first payment,4" or that defendant will employ
"' See text accompanying notes 50-57 infra, and cases cited in note 51
infra.
"See text accompanying notes 58-71 infra.
' See note 54 infra and accompanying text.
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claimant for life." To a businessman, some of these things are ob-
viously false; to the injured they are often entirely credible state-
ments. Unless such statements are so unlikely that no one could
believe them, a release signed because of them ought to be set aside.
No defendant should be permitted to avoid full payment for his
original wrong on the ground that he has compounded that wrong by
fraud. Perhaps this rule should not apply where the settlement has
been consummated by a consent judgment, for the reasons mentioned
earlier.4" But where, as is ordinary, the settlement is consummated
by release, there should be no serious problem in rescinding it.
Misrepresentations of Law
It is often said that a misrepresentation of law-as distinguished
from a misrepresentation of fact-is not actionable. There seems to
be no good reason for this rule and it is therefore difficult to tell
just when, or how, it will be applied. Two contradictory reasons are
given for it."0 One is that everyone is presumed to know the law;
therefore when an adjuster tells claimant that he has no legal rights,
claimant should know better. The other reason is that no one knows
the law; therefore when an adjuster tells claimant that he has no legal
rights, claimant should realize that the adjuster does not know what
he is talking about. The absurdity of the rule has led to its general
condemnation and a few courts have rejected it altogether. Others
generally find a way to avoid the rule, and this is not usually difficult
because it is riddled with exceptions.
The primary exception involved in release cases is this: if the
fraud-feasor is in position to know the law, or seems to be, then the
claimant may reasonably rely on what he says. Adjusters and law-
yers are usually better educated or more experienced with claims.
Therefore, it is appropriate for a claimant to believe what he is told-
or at least a jury could so find. If so, he should not be bound by his
release.
A number of cases are in accord with this rule." Perhaps a
, See note 55 infra.
See Part II supra.
The history of the rule, its contradictory reasons, and its general appli-
cation are discussed in Keeton, Fraud: Misrepresentations of Law, 15 TEx.
L. REv. 409 (1937).
" See Camerlin v. New York Cent. R.R., 109 F.2d 698 (1st Cir. 1952),
where defendant implied that the plaintiff, who was covered by the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, could only recover under state workmen's corn-
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larger number grant relief without even discussing representations
of law at all. 2 In still others no one even thinks of applying the
hoary "representations of law" rule and recovery is permitted. These
are cases where the statement involved has a certain amount of
factual content and is more than a mere legal conclusion. For
example, a representation sometimes made is that the claimant has
to sign the release to get some insurance, implying that the release
does not bar recovery of damages later. Although this sort of state-
ment involves some legal conclusions, it is not usually called a mis-
representation of law.5" Similarly, if an adjuster says that the release
is only a receipt5 4 or that it says plaintiff will have lifetime employ-
ment,55 there is no difficulty, for these are purely statements of fact.
In spite of the general view that a claimant may reasonably rely
on misstatements of law made to him by a person in position to know
pensation. In Sainsbury v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 183 F.2d
548 (4th Cir. 1950), a service man, injured by the defendant, was told he
could recover only a limited amount since the government paid for his medical
attention. The cases are collected in Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 266 (1952).
2 Frazier v. Sims Motor Transp. Lines, Inc., 196 F.2d 914 (7th Cir.
1952) (adjuster told plaintiff he could recover only $600 in court) ; Elledge
v. Cornelius, 86 F. Supp. 766 (D. Okla. 1947) (lawyer told plaintiff he
could settle and still claim workmen's compensation). In Styron v. Atlantic
& N.C. Ry., 161 N.C. 78, 76 S.E. 692 (1912), plaintiff was told that she had
no claim against the town. The court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff
in spite of her release without mentioning any possibility that this was a mis-
representation of law. Cf. cases cited in note 51 supra.
" See, e.g., McCall v. Toxaway Tanning Co., 152 N.C. 648, 68 S.E. 136
(1910). Cf. Dorsett v. Clement-Ross Mfg. Co., 131 N.C. 254, 42 S.E. 612
(1902) (plaintiff asked to sign release so that doctors could be paid).
' In Camerlin v. New York Cent. R.R., 199 F.2d 698 (1st Cir. 1952),
relief was granted even though the plaintiff had copied the words "I have
read and understand this release" on the face of the document. In Ricketts
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1946), plaintiff's own attorney
allegedly told him the release was a receipt for back wages only. In cases
such as these, plaintiff must show some good reason why lie did not read
the release, or, if he did read it, that he did not understand it. Of course,
the fraud of the defendant may have induced him not to read the release, and
if so, recovery is permitted. Cowart v. Honeycutt, 257 N.C. 136, 125 S.E.2d
382 (1962); Dorsett v. Clement-Ross Mfg. Co., supra note 53. Presumably
if plaintiff was represented by counsel, a representation of law to the attorney
would not be effective. Cf. McGill v. Bison Fast Freight, Inc., 254 N.C.
469, 96 S.E.2d 438 (1957).
" Hayes v. Atlanta & Charlotte Air Lines Ry., 143 N.C. 125, 55 S.E. 437
(1906) (release read to plaintiff, an illiterate, as containing clause for em-
ployment). But unless the plaintiff has an excuse for not reading the release,
or if the defendant is not fraudulent, plaintiff's belief in a promise of lifetime
employment does not entitle him to relief. Aderholt v. Seaboard Air Lines
Ry., 152 N.C. 411, 67 S.E. 978 (1910); White v. Richmond & D.R.R., 110
N.C. 456, 15 S.E. 197 (1892).
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something about law, there are a few striking cases to the contrary.
One is Massey v. North Carolina Pub. Serv. Co.56 The plaintiff
was apparently a Negro tenant farmer. The adjuster told him that
his claim was legally worthless and that if he "put it in law you won't
get anything; you will have enemies of white and colored." Plaintiff
accepted the offer of a small settlement, remarking that he could not
afford to have white enemies. The court upheld the validity of the
release saying the representation "might well be considered as a
representation of law and not of fact," and that ordinarily "such
representations do not create a cause of action."'5 7
On the whole, however, it seems probable that few claimants
today will be barred from relief if they genuinely relied on a misstate-
ment of law.
Opinion
Plaintiffs more often have trouble with the dogma that statements
of opinion are not actionable.5" Like the rule against relief for mis-
representations of law, this dogma generally has been debunked.
It is a headless monster, full of no purpose and going nowhere-but
it often manages to blunder into innocent victims of fraud.
Tort victims are frequently told by adjusters or doctors that they
are not seriously injured or, what amounts to the same thing, that
they will be back at work in a few weeks. On the basis of such
representations, they sign releases. When it turns out that their
injuries are permanent and that the doctor or adjuster knew it all
along, they rightly wish to rescind the release and sue for the
damages to which they are entitled. Many courts today will grant
such relief.
A good many decisions which assert that statements of opinion
are not actionable appear to mean a good deal less. In many cases
there was no fraud at all-that is, the doctor really believed that the
plaintiff would be well in a few weeks and had no intent to deceive
him. In such cases it is relevant that the statement is in the form
of an opinion, but only because it may indicate that there was no
" 196 N.C. 299, 145 S.E. 561 (1928).
57 Id. at 301, 145 S.E. at 562. But cf. Hopskins v. Fidelity Ins. Co., 240
S.C. 230, 125 S.E.2d 468 (1962).
" See generally Keeton, Fraud: Misrepresentations of Opinion, 21 MINN.
L. REv. 643 (1937).
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intentional deception.59 Such cases are no authority for the purported
rule that misstatements of opinion are not actionable; they are only
authority for the rule that intent to deceive may be necessary in some
jurisdictions.6
Thus if a doctor intentionally misstates his opinion, and plaintiff
can prove it, there should be no difficulty in rescinding the release,
providing only that the defendant is chargeable with the doctor's
lie. 1 In such cases reliance by the injured claimant is usually
reasonable, because the doctor is an expert and a layman may
justifiably rely on the opinions of experts, 62 just as courts may accept
their testimony. In appropriate circumstances, even an adjuster's
statement as to the claimant's health may justify reliance and re-
scission.6 3
"' Fraud usually requires an intent to deceive or an intentional misstate-
ment, but even an innocent misstatement may justify relief by way of rescis-
sion. In release cases the innocent misstatement is often called "constructive
fraud" or "mutual mistake." See text accompanying notes 134-39 infra.
" Thus in Texas Midland R.R. v. Wilson, 263 S.W. 1109 (Tex. Civ. App.
1924), the court quoted 23 R.C.L. 392: "Representations by the releasee's
physician as to future results of the injuries . . . if made in good faith, are
mere expressions of opinion. . . ." If they are made "in good faith," there
is no fraud at all. That seems to be the meaning of many cases cited as sup-
porting the rule against relief in this area. However, some of the same
courts permit relief for innocent or good faith representations which turn
out to be false if they are not "mere expressions of opinion." See, e.g.,
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Peterson, 34 Ariz. 292, 271 Pac. 406 (1928).
" Typically the doctor must have been hired by the defendant. Prince
v. Kansas City So. Ry., 229 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. 1950); Fort Worth & R.G. Ry.
v. Pickens, 153 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), reVd on other grounds,
139 Tex. 181, 162 S.W.2d 691 (1942). Sometimes this causes considerable
difficulty. See Chicago, R.I. & G. Ry. v. Taylor, 203 S.W. 90 (Tex. Civ. App.
1918). In Rickets v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757 (2d Cir 1946), the
plaintiff's own attorney had induced him to execute a release by fraud; plain-
tiff was permitted to avoid the release with one judge dissenting. The
other two judges differed as to the grounds. Judge Frank favored relief
on a mistake theory; Judge Hand favored relief because of the fraud of
plaintiff's attorney.
2 See generally Keeton, supra note 58, at 647-50. Unlike the sales-of-
goods situation, opinions in release cases can seldom be regarded as puffing or
dealer's talk which might be accepted in our society and therefore "innocent."
Occasionally, however, decisions do point out that a claimant is in a bargain-
ing situation and must expect a certain amount of "sales talk" from de-
fendant or his adjuster. And an adjuster's statement that the doctor's
opinions were reliable might be regarded as mere puffing. See Prince v.
Kansas City So. Ry., 229 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. 1950).
" See Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 68 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934), where
the individual defendant, a layman, told the plaintiff she would be up in a
short time; Simmons v. Kalin, 10 Wash. 2d 409, 116 P.2d 840 (1941), where
the adjuster concealed the doctor's knowledge of a broken bone. But see
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Many courts distinguish two kinds of statements made in these
circumstances. The first is a statement of opinion as to the claimant's
present physical condition, e.g., "you are well," "you have only one
broken bone," or the like. All courts seem willing to treat such
statements as statements of fact, and, if made fraudulently, they
justify relief.04 The second kind of statement is sometimes labeled
a "prediction" or mere "prognosis." The doctor says "you will be
well in a week," or "you will have only 10% disability," or "you will
regain your sight." Many courts say that such a statement is not one
of fact and hence not actionable.0 5
The distinction is unfortunate. It makes some cases turn on the
form of words used. Any lawyer knows testimony as to exact words
used is often unreliable. More than that, the form of words is seldom
important in determining their meaning. An assertion by a doctor
that plaintiff will be on his feet in a week certainly asserts a great
deal about the plantiff's present condition. If the assertion is false,
and if the plaintiff reasonably relied on it, there is no good reason
why the defendant should profit from this form of fraud. In the much-
quoted Scheer case 6 Judge Learned Hand said:
To tell a layman who has been injured that he will be about
again in a short time is to do more than prophesy about his
recovery. No doubt it is a forecast, but it is ordinarily more
than a forecast; it is an assurance as to his present condition,
and so understood.
A few other courts have recognized and acted upon this idea." Still
others grant relief where defendant's doctor makes such a prognosis,
Prince v. Kansas City So. Ry., supra note 62, where the adjuster's fraud con-
sisted in boasting of the value of the doctor's opinion and this was held in-
sufficient to justify relief; Ward v. Heath, 222 N.C. 470, 24 S.E.2d 5 (1943),
where relief was denied on a number of grounds, among them that the
adjuster, not a doctor, made the false statements about plaintiff's condition.
"' See, e.g., Prince v. Kansas City So. Ry., 229 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. 1950);
Tattershall v. Yellow Cab. Co., 225 Mo. App. 611, 37 S.W.2d 659 (1931);
McMahan v. Carolina Spruce Co., 180 N.C. 636, 105 S.E. 439 (1920). See
generally Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 82, 135 (1960).
" See, e.g., Conklin v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 331 Mo. 734, 55 S.W.2d 306
(1934); Texas Midland R.R. v. Wilson, 263 S.W. 1109 (Tex. Civ. App.
1924).
" Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 68 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934).
67 Id. at 945.
" See Ciletti v. Union Pac. R.R., 196 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1952); Graham v.
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 176 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1949); Allison v. Chicago
Great W. Ry., 240 Minn. 547, 62 N.W.2d 374 (1954).
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simply calling it a statement of fact.69 The real question in all these
cases is whether the claimant in fact relied on the opinion, whether
it is called an opinion or fact. In some cases the opinion is patently
false; it contradicts all known human experience. If so, the plaintiff
probably did not rely on any such statement and we can further doubt
whether the statement was even made at all. In those circumstances,
relief is appropriately denied to the plaintiff.70  But normally
claimants do rely on doctor's opinions, and they equally rely on the
doctor to disclose full information.71  When they do so rely-and
this is usually a jury question-the defendant should not escape
his primary liability for the original injury simply because he knows
enough to speak in the form of opinion.
The Tort Action for Deceit
Usually the relief awarded to the plantiff for fraud in obtaining
a release is in the form of rescission. The release is set aside formally
in a separate action, or in the action for personal injuries is held not
to bar the recovery if obtained by fraud. However, the defendant's
fraud in obtaining the release may be the sort that would justify an
action at law, not for the personal injury, but for deceit. This tort
action for damages for fraud is of the sort used by plaintiffs who have
" Ozan Graysonia Lumber Co. v. Ward, 188 Ark. 557, 66 S.W.2d 1074
(1934). See also Ciletti v. Union Pac. R.R., supra note 68.
" Thus where plaintiff's own doctor is available, or his own knowledge of
his condition belies the statement, it is often said that his reliance is not
reasonable or, more accurately, that there was no reliance at all. See
Conklin v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 331 Mo. 734, 55 S.W.2d 306 (1932); Ward
v. Heath, 222 N.C. 470, 24 S.E.2d 5 (1943). But see Associated Employers
Lloyds v. Aiken, 201 S.W.2d 856 (.Tex. Civ. App. 1947), where a work-
men's compensation claimant was given relief from a release which she
executed in reliance on doctor's statement that her eye was all right, though
she knew subjectively that it was not. On the other hand, the claimant may
know the doctor's statement is false in a subjective sense and still believe the
doctor if the claimant is uneducated and without experience. Thus in Prince
v. Kansas City So. Ry., 229 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. 1950), the doctor told claimant
that certain chest symptoms were only the natural result of a hernia operation.
But claimant had the symptoms before the operation and could hardly have
believed such a statement. On the question of reliance the court said: "Re-
spondent was a man of little education who had had no prior experience with
surgical operations. He was hardly on an equal footing in his relationship
with Dr. Miller, and it is to be expected that he would repose confidence in
his doctor who possessed special learning and skill." Id. at 572.
" Hence relief in cases where medical information is concealed from
claimant, who signs the release in ignorance. Ciletti v. Union Pac. R.R., 196
F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1952) (relief on this and other grounds); Simmons v.
Kalin, 10 Wash. 2d 409, 116 P.2d 840 (1941).
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been induced to buy phoney shares of stock, or homes infested with
hidden termites and the like. Usually those transactions may be
rescinded, but the plaintiff may affirm the transaction, give up his
remedy of rescission, and sue for damages. There seems to be no
theoretical reason why this alternative remedy should not be available
against a defendant who fraudulently obtains a release, and some
courts have permitted it.7 2
An action of this kind will present complexities not encountered
in an action to rescind the release or an action for personal injuries
in which the plaintiff attempts to avoid the release because of the
fraud. Nevertheless, it may have some advantage to plaintiffs. Thus
the plaintiff who cannot restore the consideration received for the
release, in some jurisdictions, will be barred from relief by re-
scission,"3 but may nevertheless be entitled to maintain the tort action
for deceit. It is also possible that the measure of damages in deceit
will be more favorable than in the personal injury action, and it is
this point that raises difficulties.
Suppose a plaintiff settles his claim against the defendant for
fifty dollars because the defendant fraudulently tells plaintiff that an
x-ray shows no broken bones, when in fact plaintiff has several
broken vertebrae. Now if there had been no fraud, or if the plain-
tiff had not believed the misrepresentation, several different things
might have happened. One is that the plaintiff might have settled,
but for a greater amount of money. Another is that the plaintiff
might have to go to trial, in which case he might have won or lost.
Suppose he would have lost, because the defendant was not negligent
or the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. Suppose fur-
ther, that absent fraud, the defendant would nevertheless have paid
1000 dollars in settlement to avoid the expense of litigation. Under
either of the two rules for deceit damages, 4 the problem is what
amount the plaintiff should recover in an action for deceit. Should it
be 950 dollars, representing what the defendant would have paid in
" See Immel, The Requirement of Restoration in the Avoidance of
Releases of Tort Claims, 31 NOTRE DAME LAW. 629, 673 (1956).
This requirement is discussed in text accompanying notes 195-204 infra.
*' One rule gives plaintiff the loss of his bargain, i.e., the value he would
have obtained if the representation had been true. The other gives him
his "out of pocket" loss, i.e., the difference between what he parted with
and what he got. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 121 (1935); PROSSER, TORTS
§ 91 (2d ed. 1955). Neither of these seems easy to apply in a release-
rescission case, but the loss of bargain rule is especially difficult. See Immel,
supra note 72.
[Vol. 41
1963] PERSONAL INJURY SETTLEMENTS 689
settlement had there been no fraud? Or should it be nothing-the
amount the plaintiff would have recovered on a trial of the merits?
If it is the former, it will pay the plaintiff to sue in tort for the deceit,
for if he sought rescission he would still get nothing because he has
no rights on the merits.
If the measure of damages is what the plaintiff could and would
have settled for absent fraud, he may recover in the deceit action even
though he would lose in a trial on the merits. His proof need only be
that he could have settled for a greater sum absent fraud. Hence, he
has a real loss, though he was undeserving on the merits. But to
prove the loss he will almost surely have to prove some facts about
his case, facts that would show what the settlement probably would
have been. The more he shows of this kind of fact, the closer he gets
to putting the merits of the case before the jury, with the danger that
the merits will become seriously confused with the cause of action
for deceit.
If the measure of damages is what the plaintiff could have re-
covered at a trial, then the deceit action is substantially the same in
result as an action for rescission or a trial on the merits in which
the release is not permitted as a defense. The result of this approach
is that the jury must be instructed on two theories-first, the rules
for deceit, and second, the rules that establish the plaintiff's rights
on the merits. This would also entail considerable confusion and
would be quite unnecessary since a direct action for the personal
injury could do the same thing.
Whichever approach is taken, the deceit action will introduce
confusion that is quite unnecessary, except as a devious means of
avoiding the requirement of tender. There are other plaintiff-
advantages, but few of them seem worthy of protection at the expense
of such confusion. One has been mentioned-the fact that plaintiff
may be able to recover damages for the deceit even though he had no
rights on the merits. This is proper enough in itself, since plaintiff
has actually lost money he would have received had there been no
fraud. But it does not seem sufficiently worthy of protection if his
claim was only a nuisance-value claim. Perhaps plaintiffs could
gain much in an action for deceit by suing, not the individual de-
fendant, but his insurance company which fraudulently procured
the release. Any plaintiff is glad to have an insurance company as a
named defendant. But in most states there is no direct action against
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the liability insurance company on the merits and the deceit action
is only a means to avoid this policy. There seems no good reason
to permit it.
The courts are divided on whether or not the plaintiff may be
permitted to sue for deceit or whether he must seek relief more di-
rectly by an action for personal injuries in which the release will be
in issue. Some courts have denied plaintiffs the right to sue in deceit
for reasons like those mentioned above,75 while others have assigned
technical reasons which do not always seem to apply. 70 Whatever
reason is given, these courts avoid much unnecessary confusion by
insisting that the plaintiff's relief should be a direct action for per-
sonal injuries where the fraudulently obtained release will not be
a bar.
There may, nevertheless, be a few occasions when a deceit action
could be justified. The plaintiff who has no rights on the merits, but
is defrauded and prevented from a substantial settlement, may con-
tend with much justification that relief ought to be given, though he
could not have won at a trial. Perhaps if the fraud is egregious and
the loss to the plaintiff is great enough, such an argument ought to
prevail. But on the whole the confusion and difficulty of trying
such a claim, and the probability of its ultimate failure, is a good
indication that the deceit action should not be allowed. Where the
plaintiff can obtain service of process by use of a deceit action and
not by suit on the original claim, other considerations may prevail.
Suppose A and B are involved in an automobile collision in Cali-
fornia. Suppose A, who is injured, resides in North Carolina where,
due to B's fraud, he executes a release. If he sues on his original
cause of action the suit must be in California or where B can be
found. But, assuming a valid statute permits it, he might sue for
the tort of deceit in North Carolina and obtain valid service of
process there, at least against B's insurance company because it does
business in North Carolina and committed the fraud there. In such
a situation, the action of deceit against the insurance company might
be permitted with much justification. Another justification that
" Shallenberger v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 167 Ohio St. 494, 150 N.E.2d
295 (1958).
76 Hopkins v. Fidelity Ins. Co., 240 S.C. 230, 125 S.E.2d 468 (1962).
Apparently the deceit action has been ruled out as a practical matter in North
Carolina by Davis v. Hargett, 244 N.C. 157, 92 S.E.2d 782 (1956), but the
decision may apply only to deceit actions against third persons who were
not responsible for the original tort.
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might be urged with some force is that the action for fraud against the
insurance company would not directly involve the original defendant.
Such a course may be fairer, since it is usually the insurance company,
not the original defendant, that committed the fraud, if any was in
fact committed. This may be especially important where the original
claim on the merits exceeds the policy limits, for to re-open the
litigation on the merits subjects the original defendant to potential
personal liability for the fraud of the insurance company, while in
an action for deceit aimed solely at the insurance company which
committed the fraud, it, and only it, would be liable. The chances
of such special difficulties seem, however, remote. Perhaps when
special considerations of the sort mentioned here are involved the
action for deceit should lie. Otherwise, the judicial process will be
better served by requiring the victim of fraud to sue directly for
his personal injury and to avoid the release if it was procured by
fraud.
Proof of Fraud
The central problem for the plaintiff who seeks to prove fraud is
one of fact, not one of law. He must convince a jury and he must
convince a reviewing court that his evidence was sufficient for that
purpose. Sometimes he must prove fraud, not merely by a prepond-
erance of the evidence, but by "clear, cogent and convincing evi-
dence.' ' 77 Any evidence that shores up the plaintiff's own testimony
on the fraud point may be valuable. For example, proof that the
consideration paid for the release was inadequate tends to corroborate
the charge of fraud. Similarly, if the plaintiff was ill at the time the
settlement was made, he was probably more susceptible to unfair deal-
ing and this also will corroborate his contention that the defendant
misrepresented the facts. This kind of proof, standing alone, does
not prove anything, however, and it would seem relevant primarily
for the purpose of bolstering plaintiff's other proof. However, fac-
tors of this sort should never be overlooked in preparing proof of
fraud. At the same time it is apparent that plantiffs are often given
relief even when other proof of fraud is missing or doubtful merely
because there is proof of some serious misconduct on the part of the
defendant. Cases that give relief when factors like these are present
often pretend to do so on the ground that they prove fraud. But the
"' This requirement is discussed in text accompanying notes 205-09 infra.
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real basis seems to be that misconduct short of fraud is sufficient
to justify relief. Accordingly, these cases are considered here as
separate grounds for avoiding the release.
B. Other Misconduct Short of Fraud
Inadequate Consideration
All decisions seem to recognize that mere inadequate considera-
tion paid for a release is no ground for avoiding the release. 8 "[T] he
amount paid by the defendant is of no consequence if the demand
for damages was wholly unliquidated." '  The same is true where
the claim is partly liquidated, as where the defendant pays for the
exact damage to the claimant's automobile. If, in such a case, the
claimant later discovers a personal injury, the release for property
damage is also a bar to his personal injury claim, though obviously
no consideration was paid beyond the amount of car damage.8"
In a number of cases inadequacy of consideration, even when
coupled with misconduct by a defendant, has not been enough.
Several decisions seem to have accepted without qualm the practice
of some railroads to lay off injured workers and to rehire them only
when they have executed a release. When such releases are attacked
they have been upheld in spite of this obvious pressure coupled with
inadequate compensation-such as a promise to employ for one
further day.81
From a contractual point of view such cases seem in accord with
"See, e.g., Trokey v. United States Cartridge Co., 222 S.W.2d 496
(Mo. App. 1949); Watkins v. Grier, 224 N.C. 339, 30 S.E.2d 223 (1944).
See generally Annot., 48 A.L.R. 1462, 1515 (1927).
" Ross v. Koenig, 129 Conn. 403, 28 A.2d 875, 877 (1942).
80 Hutcheson v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 576 (D. Ark. 1962) ; Darens-
bourg v. Columbia Cas. Co., 140 So. 2d 241 (La. App. 1962). In Casey v.
Proctor, 22 Cal. Rptr. 531 (Cal. App. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 28
Cal. Rptr. 307, 378 P.2d 579 (1963), the court rejected the argument that
since payments equalled the value of the car, there was no consideration for
injury. But see Warren v. Crockett, 364 S.W.2d 352, 354 (Tenn. 1963),
where the court said: "So, virtually the whole consideration that passed to
him was for his property damage; and no consideration actually passed to her
for release of her personal injuries." The actual holding in Warren seems
to be based on mutual mistake, but it is not clear whether the quoted lan-
guage indicates an alternative holding.
" This was the situation in St. Louis-S.F. Ry. v. Ferguson, 325 P.2d 735
(Okla. 1958), and Lusk v. White, 58 Okla. 773, 161 Pac. 541 (1916). Cf.
Maynard v. Durham & So. Ry., 251 N.C. 783, 112 S.E.2d 249 (1960), rev'd,
365 U.S. 160 (1961) (reversed because jury should decide whether the con-
sideration was "back pay"). In Maynard, unlike the other cases cited, there
was a cash consideration in addition to re-employment.
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the general rules in other types of cases. But inadequate considera-
tion may be important, not on the contract issue, but on the issue of
fraud, 2 mistake,8 3 or undue influence,84 and the decisions generally
so recognize.85
For example, if a plaintiff contends that defendant misrepresented
to him his legal rights, the fact that defendant paid fifty dollars on
a claim clearly worth 1,000 dollars is strong evidence supporting the
plaintiff's contention, though by no means is it conclusive. Thus
where the plaintiff, an ignorant woman, was told by defendant that
she had no legal claim and accepted six dollars in settlement, her
claim of fraud was upheld and she was permitted to recover 325
dollars in spite of her release.8 6 It is important in such cases to
notice that the plaintiff should have recovered in any event if the
jury believed the testimony, for there is generally enough evidence
to establish a misrepresentation. The importance of inadequacy of
consideration in cases of this sort is, therefore, limited. It may help
convince the jury, along with other facts. It may likewise convince
the court that there is, in a close case, sufficient evidence for the
jury, so that a nonsuit can be avoided. Beyond that most courts
have never gone in these cases; inadequacy of consideration is one
factor but no more.
Suppose, however, there is no other evidence of fraud-just
grossly inadequate consideration. Could a finding of fraud be sus-
tained under such circumstances? A few courts in release cases
have intimated that fraud would be found. 7  North Carolina seems
to have fully accepted and applied such a view, and in a number of
cases has permitted a finding of fraud even where no misrepresenta-
tion at all is shown. These cases deserve some further treatment.
See Ross v. Koenig, 129 Conn. 403, 28 A.2d 875 (1942).
See Hume v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 121 F.2d 336 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 684 (1941).
" See King v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 157 N.C. 44, 63-64, 72 S.E. 801,
808-09 (1911).
See Annot., 48 A.L.R. 1462, 1515 (1927).
Styron v. Atlantic & N.C. Ry., 161 N.C. 78, 76 S.E. 692 (1912);
accord, Kansas City, M. & B.R.R. v. Chiles, 86 Miss. 361, 38 So. 498 (1905).
"' Ross v. Koenig, 129 Conn. 403, 28 A.2d 875 (1942), citing an earlier
Connecticut case, Benedict v. Dickens' Heirs, 119 Conn. 541, 177 Atl. 715(1935), which did not involve releases. Other courts sometimes imply that
if the consideration is so small as to "shock the conscience," something
vague might be done about it; but such statements are often followed by
strong language implying just the opposite. See Aponaug Mfg. Co. v.
Collins, 207 Miss. 460, 42 So. 2d 431 (1949).
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The first suggestion of such a rule in North Carolina came in
1902 in Dorsett v. Clement-Ross Mfg. Co."s There plaintiff's arm
was mangled in machinery belonging to the defendant-employer.
Amputation was required. Six weeks later the doctor and adjuster
told the plaintiff, who was illiterate, that he should sign the paper
they showed him so that the doctors could get their money and that
if he did, they would give him fifteen dollars for his time. The
"paper" was a release. Plaintiff later brought this action for his
injuries and obtained a jury verdict. The court affirmed, saying
fraud was established since the adjuster and doctor clearly misled
plaintiff as to the effect of the paper he signed. There were other
factors of misconduct as well. The court then added:
It is true that inadequacy of consideration alone is not
sufficient to set aside a written instrument 'unless the con-
sideration is so inadequate as to shock the moral senses and
cause reasonable persons to say he got it for nothing'. But
it is proper evidence to be considered upon an issue of fraud
and may, in connection with other evidence and circum-
stances tending to show fraud, be sufficient to establish the
fraud.... .9
The court added that there was, in the case before it, "no real
consideration" to support the release. The court cited no authority
for the implied proposition that shockingly inadequate consideration
might be enough to set aside the release." Further, it seems quite
clear that the plaintiff had sufficient evidence to justify the recovery
he received and the allusion to inadequate consideration was un-
necessary.
Some nine years later the court, in what seems to be a dictum,
affirmed the implication of Dorsett, saying that the consideration paid
for a release "must not be so small as to cause one of ordinary dis-
cretion and judgment to say he paid nothing.""' The court cited two
-s 131 N.C. 254, 42 S.E. 612 (1902).
Id. at 260, 42 S.E. at 614.
90The court cited McLeod v. Bullard, 84 N.C. 515 (1881). That case
was not a release case, but one in which a deed was obtained by fraud.
The court in that case said, "a want of consideration and a gross inadequacy
of price are each some evidence of fraud and may, in connection with other
circumstances ... furnish ground ... for setting aside a contract. . . ." Id.
at 527. (Emphasis added.)
" King v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 157 N.C. 44, 53, 72 S.E. 801, 804
(1911).
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cases,9 2 both of which involved, not the question of what considera-
tion was needed to sustain a contract, but the question of whether
a conveyance was made in fraud of creditors.
At this point the doctrine would seem to have very little support
indeed, for the cases enunciating it have not applied it and they are
not grounded in authority. But in the same year the North Carolina
court did apply the doctrine in a case where there was no claim of a
misrepresentation at all.93 The evidence there showed (1) that
plaintiff was illiterate and blind and hard of hearing; (2) that his
wife and brother were excluded from the room when the release was
signed; (3) that "he thought" he was signing a receipt; and (4)
that the consideration was 372 dollars, "whereas the jury found
that $4,850 was reasonable and just compensation." The court held
the evidence was sufficient to take the case to the jury on the issue
of fraud. The impressive feature of this decision is that the plaintiff
did not assert, so far as the court indicates, that defendant mis-
represented anything. It is not clear whether the decision would
have been the same absent the inadequate consideration point.
The decision was followed by one which, on somewhat less con-
vincing facts, reversed, for error in the instructions, a judgment for
a plaintiff who had settled for seven dollars.9" The court pointed
out that grossly inadequate consideration would never constitute
fraud as a matter of law.
In two other cases recoveries were predicated on grossly inade-
quate consideration as evidence of fraud where, in addition, there
was evidence that plaintiff was in financial distress at the time of the
settlement." In neither case does there seem to be any evidence of
2 Fullenwider v. Roberts, 20 N.C. 420 (1839) ; Worthy v. Caddell, 76 N.C.
82 (1877).
"3 Brazille v. Carolina Barytes Co., 157 N.C. 454, 73 S.E. 215 (1911).
Fraud was alleged and the court in reciting the facts said there was evidence
of a misrepresentation. But none is alluded to in the opinion, and the court
in summarizing the evidence in favor of the plaintiff does not indicate any
testimony of the plaintiff to the effect that an actual misrepresentation was
made.
"'Knight v. Vincennes Bridge Co., 172 N.C. 393, 90 S.E. 412 (1916).
See McMahan v. Carolina Spruce Co., 180 N.C. 636, 105 S.E. 439 (1920),
where the defendant's doctor misrepresented the injury. There seems to
have been no proof of fraud, i.e., intentional misrepresentation. But settle-
ment was for $165 as compared to an ultimate verdict of $6500. The judg-
ment for the plaintiff was upheld.
" Preddy v. Britt, 212 N.C. 719, 194 S.E. 494 (1938); Butler v. Armour
Fertilizer Works, 195 N.C. 409, 142 S.E. 483 (1928) (settlements for $220
and $578 as against jury verdicts for $1,000 and $5,000).
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fraud other than the relatively small settlement. In both, however,
there is one other factor-the plaintiff's financial distress. This
factor suggests that defendant may have taken undue advantage of
the plaintiff in settling for such a small sum. But as for fraud, there
seems to be no evidence.
A somewhat similar case96 was decided by the federal court under
North Carolina law and reached the same result where, in addition to
gross inadequacy of the settlement the court emphasized that the
plaintiff was illiterate and had no counsel. In some respects this is
perhaps the most liberal case. There was a conflict in the evidence
as to whether releases were explained to the plaintiff, and perhaps
that alone, as to a known illiterate, was enough to indicate fraud.
Beyond this, however, there was little more than gross inadequacy.
Even the inadequacy is doubtful. The case involved the deaths of
three persons for whom the plaintiff was appointed administrator
at the request of the defendant railroad in order to make a settlement.
He was paid 950 dollars in settlement of all three deaths. A small
sum, but when the release was avoided the jury returned verdicts
for only a total of 4,000 dollars.
The conclusion seems to be this: North Carolina has recognized
a broad rule which permits the jury to consider gross inadequacy
of consideration as evidence of fraud. It has said that this alone may
be sufficient without other evidence.9" But in all cases where re-
covery was granted on this ground, there were actually other factors
involved whether the court recognized them explicitly or not. At
the same time the "other factors" need not necessarily be proof of
:fraud-perhaps the suggestion of plaintiff's difficult bargaining posi-
tion is enough.9" In short, in any appropriate case, grossly in-
adequate consideration without any appreciable other proof of fraud,
will take the case to the jury.
What constitutes "grossly inadequate consideration" remains
something of a mystery. It does seem clear that the North Carolina
Court has granted recovery on this basis in cases where it is quite
difficult to say that the defendant "paid nothing"-the standard first
used. When the defendant pays Z20 dollars and the verdict of the
11 Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Gill, 227 F.2d 64 (4th Cir. 1955).
'7E.g., Butler v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 195 N.C. 409, 142 S.E. 483
(1928). This is the clear implication in the other cases cited in connection
with this issue.
"' See cases cited note 95 supra.
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jury is 1,000 dollars"9 he has obviously paid more than "a mere
nothing" and the payment is hardly even shocking. Indeed, if 1,000
dollars would have been a fair settlement, it is at least doubtful that
recovery should be permitted on such facts, absent additional mis-
conduct by defendant.
Two further things ought to be said about the inadequate consid-
eration cases. One is that, although inadequate consideration may
aid in proving fraud, the real principle in most of the cases is not that
fraud is proved but that misconduct short of fraud is in evidence and
that the tort-feasor should not be able to minimize liability by such
misconduct. Thus it is considered unconscionable to allow a tort-
feasor to take undue advantage of a necessitous claimant to force an
extremely small settlement. However, to label these cases as fraud
decisions is to obscure the operative principle.
The other thing to be noticed about such cases is that they have
the great advantage to the plaintiff of forcing attention on the practi-
calities of the matter and especially upon the money difference be-
tween what the tortfeasor paid and what he owed. In some cases
this may amount merely to a showing of a mistake by the claimant
as to the seriousness of his injury. If the mistake is serious enough,
he may receive relief under the fraud theory by showing inadequate
compensation-which is merely another way of showing a mistake so
serious as to justify the aid of the courts.
At the same time the claimant who settles for a grossly inadequate
compensation must meet at least some of the ordinary fraud rules.
He must still read the release unless prevented from doing so by
fraud,'00 and he must show reasonable reliance on the misrepresenta-
tion made by defendant if defendant actually made one.1 1
Duress and Misconduct-Capacity
The common law recognized that a contract made under threat of
physical harm or imprisonment was no contract at all, and the same,
Preddy v. Britt, 212 N.C. 719, 194 S.E. 494 (1938).
"' Cowart v. Honeycutt, 257 N.C. 136, 125 S.E.2d 382 (1962); Watkins
v. Grier, 224 N.C. 339, 30 S.E.2d 223 (1944).
"I1 Davis v. Davis, 256 N.C. 468, 124 S.E.2d 130 (1962). In the cases
where no actual misrepresentation is charged, and the plaintiff is relying on
gross inadequacy of consideration alone or in connection with some other
misconduct short of fraud, this has not been a problem. See Brazille v. Caro-
lina Barytes Co., 157 N.C. 454, 73 S.E. 215 (1911). Thus the anomaly
that if, in addition to proof of inadequate consideration, plaintiff proves
actual fraud, he has a more difficult case to make out, for he must also prove
reasonable reliance on the misrepresentation.
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of course, would apply to a release. Today a contract or release may
be vitiated if it is made under somewhat lesser pressures. Threats
of economic pressure, if they go beyond what is normally considered
fair bargaining, are enough to avoid the contract.102  If the defendant
tells the claimant, "Sign or I'll fire your father and see that he gets
no more employment," a release so executed is void, and this is so
even though a substantial consideration is paid.0 3 The threat need
not be economic. In a West Virginia case" the defendant's adjuster
took advantage of the fact that an undertaker was holding the body
of plaintiff's child until payment was made. The adjuster's settle-
ment negotiated under such circumstances was held to be duress
which avoided the release.
There are, of course, cases where the duress seems as clear and as
intolerable but which uphold the release. A release executed because
the railroad would not continue claimant's employment until the
release was executed seems in this category.'05 Perhaps the answer
in these cases is that the argument was not made that the railroad's
threat to fire claimant, unless he signed the release, was duress. In
one of these cases 0 6 the court alludes to the plaintiff's claim of duress;
but reference to the brief for the plaintiff indicates that the point was
not argued.'0 7 Likewise the threat to a tenant farmer that unless
he settled he would "have enemies of white and colored" was held in
one case 0 s not to vitiate the release, but again the duress point
apparently was not argued, and the court decided on the issue of
fraud. It is possible that cases of this sort would be decided differ-
ently if plaintiff's counsel argued the duress point, for it certainly
seems that the threats presented were wholly unjustified and there
102 On the whole subject of duress, see Dalzell, Duress by Economic
Pressure, 20 N.C.L. REv. 237, 341 (1942); and on compromise, see id. at
374-77.
10. Perkins Oil Co. v. Fitzgerald, 56 Ark. 516, 121 S.W.2d 877 (1938).
The settlement thus induced was in the amount of $5000, a sum representing
the amount of defendant's liability insurance. The court found duress and
affirmed a judgment for $45,000.
104 Carroll v. Fetty, 121 W. Va. 215, 2 S.E.2d 521 (1939).
105 See cases cited note 81 supra.
10' Maynard v. Durham & So. Ry., 251 N.C. 783, 112 S.E.2d 249 (1960),
rev'd on other grounds, 365 U.S. 160 (1961).
101 Brief for plaintiff-appellant, pp. 18-33, an impressive review of fraud
cases in FELA actions, alludes to a claim of fraud and "undue influence," but
does not appear to argue duress or undue influence.
.0 Massey v. North Carolina Pub. Serv. Co., 196 N.C. 299, 145 S.E. 561
(1928).
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can be no policy which encourages tort-feasors to escape liability by
this kind of pressure.
A number of cases deal with more subtle forms of misconduct by
the defendant, and recoveries are frequent in these cases, though there
is neither a verbal misrepresentation nor a verbal threat. In a number
of cases the result is made to turn on the plaintiff's mental "incapaci-
ty" at the time he executed the release. Of course, the plaintiff who
executes a release while under the influence of drugs or in shock
should not be bound.10 9 More often than not, however, the "capacity"
cases do not involve any mental incapacity either in a layman's or
lawyer's sense. What they do involve is misconduct by the defendant
who takes undue advantage of a claimant who is in poor position
to bargain because of his condition.
Thus it may make no difference whether the claimant has
"mental capacity" to know what he is doing or not if the defendant
procures a release by taking undue advantage of the claimant's ig-
norance," 0 his poverty and immediate need for money,"' or his
shock." 2 In cases like these the defendant takes advantage of the
claimant's severe position and pays an unconscionably small amount.
Of course, if the defendant merely gets a good bargain, he had not
been guilty of any misconduct unless it can be said that he would not
have done so well with a normal claimant who is not so handicapped.
At the same time, any doubts in such a situation should be resolved
against the defendant, for by hypothesis he is a tort-feasor initially
responsible for the claimant's cond ition, and he ought not to escape
his full share of liability by any further misconduct, however slight.
There is no good way of stating a general rule for such cases
except to say that if, considering all the factors, the defendant may
have taken unconscionable advantage of the claimant's condition, the
"' It has been held that unless the claimant's incapacity is known to the
defendant, the release is still good. See West v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 154
N.C. 24, 69 S.E. 676 (1910) affirming 151 N.C. 231, 65 S.E. 979 (1909).
It seems doubtful whether such a rule will be followed. See Ipock v. Atlantic
& N.C.R.R., 158 N.C. 445, 74 S.E. 352 (1912); Mangum v. Brown, 200
N.C. 296, 156 S.E. 535 (1931).
110 See, e.g., Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Gill, 277 F.2d 64- (4th Cir. 1955).
. See Butler v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 195 N.C. 409, 142 S.E. 483
(1928), where the court said that even absent fraud or duress, a defendant
may not take undue advantage of a person "in peculiar necessity and dis-
tress."
... See Airline Motor Coaches v. Parks, 190 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Civ. App.
1945), aff'd without dicission of the point hereb, 193 S.W.2d 967 (Tex.
1946).
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release ought to be set aside if the claimant chooses. A number of
evidentiary facts are often important. If the plaintiff is in the hospital
when he executes a release, this alone is strong evidence that undue
advantage was taken, even though plaintiff admits he knew what
he was doing and was not under influence of drugs."3 Similarly, if
the claimant is in pain and suffering anxiety," 4 or is deprived of
friends or relatives," 5 or lacks counsel,1 1 the tendency is to avoid
the release and permit recovery. Some cases have also recognized
that an injured claimant may have special confidence in his doctor,
so that if the defendant induces the doctor to advise settlement, even
though no fraud is committed or threats made, the release should be
set aside."1
7
Some cases turn on the enormity of the defendant's conduct in
violating normal rules of social behavior. If an adjuster negotiates a
settlement with a widow while she is in the undertaker's establish-
ment to view the body of her husband, the release so obtained is
void."" Courts may talk in terms of the plaintiff's capacity or
118Butler v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 193 N.C. 632, 137 S.E. 813
(1927), subsequent appeal, 195 N.C. 409, 142 S.E. 483 (1928) (plaintiff
admitted knowing what he was doing); Puckett v. Dyer, 203 N.C. 684, 167
S.E. 43 (1932) (analogy to "fiduciary relations").
114 Bean v. Western N.C.R.R., 107 N.C. 731, 12 S.E. 600 (1890) ; Airline
Motor Coaches v. Parks, 190 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945), aff'd with-
out discussion on this point, 193 S.W.2d 967 (Tex. 1946) (good faith settle-
ment with widow while at mortuary arranging husband's funeral).
... Brazille v. Carolina Barytes Co., 157 N.C. 454, 73 S.E. 215 (1911);
Bean v. Western N.C.R.R., supra note 114; Dorsett v. Clement-Ross Mfg
Co., 131 N.C. 254, 42 S.E. 612 (1902) (adjuster badgered claimant to avoid
his consultation with wife); Kansas City, M & B.R.R. v. Chiles, 86 Miss.
361, 38 So. 498 (1905).
116 Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Gill, 227 F.2d 64 (4th Cir. 1955); Bean v.
Western N.C.R.R., 107 N.C. 731, 12 S.E. 600 (1890). And conversely, if he
does have counsel, this fact tends to negate a right to recover. See Watkins
v. Grier, 224 N.C. 339, 30 S.E.2d 223 (1944).
11 Cf. Dorsett v. Clement-Ross Mfg. Co., 131 N.C. 254, 42 S.E. 612
(1902), where the court treated the case as one of fraud, which was certainly
justified, but the underlying considerations seem to be that the defendant took
undue advantage in part by using the doctor in whom claimant had faith.
A similar case recognizing the special faith a claimant may put in the doctor
who treats him is Prince v. Kansas City So. Ry., 229 S.W.2d 568 (Mo.
1950). This case is likewise based on "fraud," but again the principal may
well be the broader one that the defendant simply may not take an unconscion-
able advantage of the injured. But see Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Huyett, 99
Tex. 630, 92 S.W. 454 (1906), in which a doctor advised settlement and
also said the plaintiff would soon be well. The decision, however, turned
on the question of whether the doctor's acts were binding upon the defendant.
... Airline Motor Coaches v. Parks, 190 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Civ. App.
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emotional state; but it would seem that a widow who settles with
one hand on the casket and the other on the cash is a reasonably cool
customer, and the real reason for granting relief is the obnoxious
behavior of the defendant.
If the claimant is, at the time of the settlement, in perfectly sound
physical and mental condition, he may still accept an unconscionably
small amount in settlement because of immediate financial need. In
normal bargaining situations, perhaps, such an element properly may
be ignored or minimized. But in all release cases it is important to
remember that the defendant is, or may be, a tortfeasor; and it would
be intolerable to allow him to minimize his legal obligation because
he has wronged a poor man, or because he has wronged an ordinary
man so badly that he is in immediate financial distress. Therefore,
the defendant is not permitted to take advantage of the claimant's
poverty or extreme need and to settle at an unconscionably low sum
because the claimant must have money immediately.
119
Cases involving defendant's misconduct tend to run together and
are most often labeled fraud cases. In all misconduct cases, the
problem is largely one of proof, but no matter how labeled, uncon-
scionable conduct by the defendant which induces a release is enough
to vitiate the settlement and permit the plaintiff to recover. The
tendency of lawyers and courts is to treat "fraud and duress" as a
single claim or argument, but it seems apparent that the cases fall
broadly into at least three general categories-fraud, meaning a mis-
representation or concealment, by silence, by words, or by conduct;
duress, a threat by silence, words, or conduct; and other forms of
misconduct that can only be described as "unconscionable." Some-
times it may be helpful to identify these categories separately, for the
duress argument in some of the cases might succeed when the fraud
argument fails. Perhaps in most cases fraud, duress, and undue
advantage should all be pleaded and argued separately; certainly,
the pleader cannot afford to ignore the fraud contention, since many
cases involving undue advantage or duress are decided under the
label of fraud.
In any event, the ball should not be lost sight of in the tangle of
1945), ajff'd without discussion of this point, 145 Tex. 44, 193 S.W.2d 967
(1946).
1
' Preddy v. Britt, 212 N.C. 719, 194 S.E. 494 (1938); Puckett v. Dyer,
203 N.C. 684, 167 S.E. 43 (1932); Butler v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 195
N.C. 409, 142 S.E. 483 (1928).
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labels. Any misconduct chargeable to the defendant and which in-
duces the execution of the release should be sufficient to avoid it,
since the tortfeasor should never be permitted to minimize his own
liability for his own wrong by his own further wrong-whether his
further wrong amounts to actionable fraud or not. This does not
mean that the plaintiff has carte blanche; he still must prove the
misconduct and he must also prove that the misconduct induced
the release. But once those things are proved, that should always
be sufficient to avoid the release.
IV. MUTUAL MISTAKE
The Technical Arguments
It is easy enough to conclude that the tortfeasor should not escape
liability because of misconduct, no matter how slight, in procuring
the release. But if he procures a release honestly and without mis-
conduct, should the release be avoided if it later turns out that the
claimant's injuries were much worse than expected? There are
some very strong technical arguments against relief here. It may
be useful to raise them in a concrete case.
Take the case of Patty Poop, whose toe is bruised when Don Doop
negligently drops a brick on it. Patty sees a doctor who treats the
toe and advises Patty to "keep a close watch on it, something might
develop." A few days later, before the toe is healed, Don's adjuster
offers Patty a settlement for fifty dollars which will cover her doctor
bill, her loss of time, and inconvenience. She accepts and executes
a release. A month later the toe still has not healed and gangrene
sets in. Amputation becomes necessary and Patty loses her leg.
When she brings suit Don's attorney pleads as a defense the release
which she has given. Patty argues that it was given under a mutual
mistake and therefore is not binding. Since we generally recognize
mutual mistake as a ground for avoiding other contracts, this may
seem reasonable enough.
Don's attorney, however, can make a strong argument against
rescission of the release on the grounds of mutual mistake. This
argument may take one of two forms. One. Patty made no mistake
at all. A mistake is a state of mind that is not in accord with the
facts.120 Patty did not have a state of mind that differed from the
facts. It is true that she was ignorant of the future, as all mortals
120 RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 6 (1937).
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are, but unless she had a positive belief that no further complications
would come about, there was no mistake. She obviously had no
such belief, for her own doctor warned her to keep an eye on the
bruise. Furthermore, the release itself provides that she released
claims of further complications and unknown injury, so she must
have recognized the risk of further loss. Two. Patty willingly
assumed the risk of future adverse developments."2' We know this
because of the release language which refers to the possibility of
future developments. She was "consciously ignorant" of what
would happen in the future, and that means she assumed the risk, or
that there was no mistake.2 2  That, indeed, is the character of all
compromise settlements.
The defendant's arguments are technically sound and they are
persuasive. Patty still has some ammunition left, however, and the
argument might proceed something like this:
Plaintiff: All that may be so, but the truth is, I never really
thought about the matter at all, I just assumed I would have no
further trouble. In legal terms I believe you call this "no meeting
of the minds," and if there is no meeting of the minds, there is no
contract.
Defendant: Of course, if you never thought about it at all, there
is no mistake at all, since you had no "state of mind" on the sub-
ject.123 As for meeting of the minds, it is true courts sometimes use
such language, but it is well settled that the mental reservations or
peculiarities are not controlling over the written language of the con-
tract, and the written language of the release makes it clear that
you are taking the risk of any future medical developments.
Plaintiff: Perhaps all that is true, but even if I did "assume the
risk" of future developments, I did not assume such a large risk. I
was willing to take the risk that the toe would be uncomfortable for
a period of time, and perhaps even that it would have to be ampu-
tated; but I certainly never intended to take the risk that I would
lose my leg.
124
221 Id. at § 11(1).
1
2
1 Id. at § 6, comment c. Professor Havinghurst has recently set out
these arguments quite clearly. See Havinghurst, Effect Upon Settlement of
Mutual Mistake as to Injuries, 12 DEF. L.J. 1, 3-5 (1963).
"I Cf. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 6, comment c (1937).
"' It seems clear that even where some risks are assumed, as in a
compromise agreement, not every conceivable risk is assumed, at least absent
written language dealing expressly with the point. Thus "even a specific
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Defendant: A clever 'argument, and if we were looking at your
subjective intention it might work. But here again the release is
right on point and it refers to the fact that you release all claims for
future developments, not just small ones. Besides, even if you did not
intend to assume the risk of a serious medical problem, even if you
did make a mistake as to how much medical problem you might have,
I made no such mistake. I intended all along that you assume all the
risk, as the release clearly shows. Therefore, even if we look at your
subjective intention, the most you can find is a unilateral mistake,
and that, as is well known, is not sufficient for relief.' 2
On these arguments, the defendant seems to have a stronger
position on the basis of the law of mistake as applied to other kinds
of contracts. It can be clearly seen from the arguments made that the
defendant's main approach centers on holding the plaintiff to the
written language of the release which releases claims for future
developments as well as existing problems. If the court is willing to
look subjectively at the parties' intentions,' 26 it may well give plain-
tiff relief, for, though plaintiff assumed the risk of future develop-
ments, she may not have assumed the risk of grave developments
such as the loss of a leg. On the other hand, if the parties specifically
considered the possibility that plaintiff might lose her leg, then it is
clear that the plaintiff subjectively as well as objectively-in her
mind as well as on paper-assumed the risk, and the release should
be upheld and recovery denied. 127
Releases today always say, in effect, that claimant assumes the
statement by the parties that the transaction is final does not make it such,
and it is not final if there is a basic mistake as to matters not believed by the
parties to be doubtful." RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION, § 11, Comment b and
Illustrations (1937). On this basis, if there is no doubt in the minds of the
parties that claimant will (a) have future medical trouble, but (b) nothing
serious, it is arguable at least that plaintiff's position is correct, unless affected
by the written language of the release.
' This point was made by the defendant and accepted by the court in
Doyle v. Teasdale, 263 Wis. 328, 57 N.W.2d 381 (1953). This writer be-
lieves the court there was in error. See text accompanying note 176 infra.
12 I.e., if neither party thought loss of a leg or other similar injury was
in the realm of reasonably likely possibilities, they did not contract with refer-
ence to such development, and that development is not within the realm of
the compromise agreement or within the realm of the assumed risk. See
note 124 supra.
127 On similar facts the court denied recovery in Mack v. Albee Press,
Inc., 263 App. Div. 275, 32 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1942), aff'd without opinion,
288 N.Y. 623, 42 N.E.2d 617 (1942). It appears that the plaintiff there had
diabetes and was more or less specifically aware of the danger when he
accepted settlement.
[Vol. 41
PERSONAL INJURY SETTLEMENTS
risk of unknown and unforeseeable injuries. If relief is given to the
plaintiff, then, it will ordinarily be because we are willing to look at
the subjective state of mind of the parties at the time the release was
signed, or because as a matter of policy we are willing to give relief
in spite of even an intentionally assumed risk, at least if the risk is
vague and not known and understood. Many courts are willing to do
just that, because behind the technical arguments, on which defend-
ant may have the better case, lie the two policy considerations
mentioned before-on the one hand, the policy of encouraging and
protecting settlements; on the other, the policy of making the tort-
feasor pay for his wrong. Because results in the cases depend upon
these policy considerations, each case must be judged very largely on
its own facts. The net result is that general rules are difficult to apply
with precision.
General Rules""8
1. Minority View Denying Relief. Some courts deny relief alto-
gether when only mistake is involved. This view emphasizes two
points. The first is the policy favoring compromise, which these
courts feel is controls over the policy of holding the tortfeasor to his
full liability when a serious mistake is made. 2 ' The second point is
that the release itself is the objective manifestation of the parties' in-
tentions and that release makes it abundantly clear that he claimant is
to assume all risks of any descripiton-unforeseeable consequences of
known injuries, unknown injuries, or anything else that may come
along. This view has the merit, at least, of avoiding the difficult
problems which the majority of courts must face-namely, how to
give relief and still make most releases useful.
2. Relief for unknown injury. The majority of courts will grant
relief where the claimant is mistaken in believing that he has no
injury, or that the injury is healed when it has not in fact done so,
or where the injury is greater than thought. These courts are
128The cases are collected in Annots., 71 A.L.R.2d 82 (1960); 117
A.L.R. 1022 (1938); 48 A.L.R. 1462 (1927).
12' "[T]here are attractive policy reasons for adopting a rule that would
permit perfectly honorable releases to be repudiated in the event of aggrava-
tion of an injury or the discovery of undiagnosed injuries. There are less
compassionate but equally sound policy reasons for requiring persons of legal
age and capacity to contract to stand by their covenants, including bargains
containing an element of change . . . ." Wheeler v. White Rock Bottling
Co., 229 Ore. 360, 367, 366 P.2d 527, 530 (1961). The dissent said: "[E]quity
will relieve a person . . . when that person in good faith gets his foot in a
trap." Id. at 371, 366 P.2d at 532.
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willing to ignore or minimize the language of the release.18 They
look at the subjective intent of the parties as gleaned from various
circumstances of the transaction, and not to the written manifestation
of intent contained in the release. Perhaps this approach is "objec-
tive" in the sense that courts do not try to read minds, but rather
look at various "objective" factors, such as the amount of payment,
the intelligence of the claimant, and other matters.' But in any
event they are not looking at the objective manifestation of intent
normally controlling-the written agreement.8 2 These courts weigh
quite heavily in the balance the policy that the innocent victim of
a tort should be paid, and paid by the tortfeasor, and for such
courts, it is more important than the counterveiling policy of protect-
ing the finality of settlements. Under this view, it is still possible for
the claimant to assume the risk, and if he does so intentionally and
subjectively, he is barred by his release. This point is discussed at
greater length later.
. 3. Relief for Innocent Misrepresentation. A third view is like the
second in that it grants relief in spite of the written language of the
release. This view says that mutual mistake is not enough, however;
relief is not granted unless the defendant or someone acting for him
makes a misrepresentation of fact to the claimant which induces the
release. This is not a requirement of fraud; it is quite enough if the
representation is an honest one and chargeable to the defendant. 188
Of course, courts which recognize mutual mistake a fortiori recognize
it when the mistake is induced by defendant's own statement; it is
still a mutual mistake, and the difference is primarily that the
defendant has been responsible for it, though not at fault. Sometimes
a mistake so induced is called "constructive fraud"'18 4 or "legal
fraud,135 labels which are probably a bit confusing and unnecessary.
"E.g., Dansby v, Buck, 92 Ariz. 1, 373 P.2d 1 (1962); Clancy v.
Pacenti, 15 Ill. App. 2d 171, 145 N.E.2d 802 (1957). To be distinguished are
cases which reach the same result by purporting to construe the release and
saying that general language releasing "all" claims does not control if
specific injuries are enumerated. See, e.g., Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Dashiell,
198 U.S. 521 (1905).
.31 Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332, 86 N.W.2d 537 (1957).
"A subjective approach in this sense is not unusual in mistake cases
generally, or so it seems to this writer.
.
38 Comnpare Houston & T.C.R.R. v. McCarty, 94 Tex. 298, 60 S.W. 429
(1901), with Associated Employers Lloyds v. Aiken, 201 S.W.2d 856 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1947). See Note, 20 TEx. L. REV. 382 (1942).
"" Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Peterson, 34 Ariz. 292, 271 Pac. 406 (1928).
133 Ozan Graysonia Lumber Co. v. Ward, 188 Ark. 557, 66 S.W.2d 1074
(1934).
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They do serve to emphasize, however, that a case based on an honest
misrepresentation is in some respects different from an ordinary
mutual mistake case. The plaintiff is certainly in a better position to
recover where his mistake is induced by the defendant, no matter how
honest the defendant is. At least that seems to represent the normal
emotional reaction. But there are other differences of a practical or-
der. One difference is that if the plaintiff's claim is based upon a mis-
representation by the defendant's agent-his doctor, for example-
the plaintiff will have to bring the misstatement home to the defend-
ant by proving the principal-agent relationship and all the other
requisites of agency.13 This is not always easy, and plaintiffs may
lose because of their failure to make such proof. Contrast with this
theory of "constructive fraud" the simple mutual mistake theory:
under a theory of mutual mistake no such proof as to the source of
the mistake would be required. But under a mutual mistake theory
the plaintiff may be obliged to prove that the mistake was indeed
mutual-i.e., that the defendant shared it, and this may itself present
a problem. A representation by the defendant, even an innocent one,
may strengthen the plaintiff's position by making it clear that the
mistake was in fact shared by the defendant. If plaintiff thinks, "I
have no broken bones," he may make a mistake. But if defendant
thinks, "I don't know whether he has broken bones or not and I'm
glad to settle for $100," it is quite doubtful whether the defendant is
mistaken. Any mistake may be unilateral. However, if the defendant
represents to the plaintiff that he has no broken bones, it is then
clear that either both plaintiff and defendant are mistaken in their
basis for settlement or the defendant is guilty of fraud. Thus a mis-
representation by a defendant, however innocent it may be, furnishes
a stronger case for the plaintiff.13 7
There may be other practical consequences if the mistake was
induced by defendant's innocent misrepresentation. The Arizona
Court once said 38 that a mistake induced by defendant's innocent
but false statements was the same thing as a mutual mistake; but
then it proceeded to say that the plaintiff did not have to restore con-
... Gulf, C. & S. Ry. v. Huyett, 99 Tex. 630, 92 S.W. 454 (1906).
"" See Doyle v. Teasdale, 263 Wis. 328, 57 N.W.2d 331 (1953), in which
the mistake was unilateral since defendant intended to settle for future com-
plications, but if defendant had represented that there would be no complica-
tions, the mistake would be mutual.
188 See Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Peterson, 34 Ariz. 292, 271 Pac. 406
(1928).
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sideration he received for the release since the defendant was guilty
of "constructive fraud."
The Problem of Assumed Risk
Under the majority view, relief is granted for a mistake and the
plaintiff who gave a release is permitted to ignore it and sue for his
personal injury. Still, he may have assumed the risk of unknown
injury when he signed the release; and if he has, the release is effec-
tive to bar any further claim. The assumption of the risk may be
shown by the plaintiff's words or conduct, though not by the release
itself. Given these rules the question of avoiding a release could be
solved simply by looking at the plaintiff's conduct and words and
determining whether he had in fact assumed the risk.' 0 But some
complex and unnecessary rules that recognize two separate situations
have been developed.
1. Unknown Injury. If the claimant suffered an injury of which
he had no knowledge and settles without knowledge of such injury,
he is usually settling only for known injuries. He and the defendant
both believe that there are no other injuries and they are not con-
tracting with reference to any other injuries. Under such circum-
stances and absent any other indication that plaintiff is to assume
the risk of unknown injuries, the claimant can usually avoid the
release under the majority rule. Actually, the majority is more
liberal than that, and in many cases the plaintiff has recovered
even though he knows his injuries are not fully healed and that they
may be worse than he thinks. Thus a claimant whose doctor told her
she was healed but who was still having eye pains was allowed to
recover when blindness developed, 40 and a number of claimants who
settled while still in pain were allowed to recover when it was later
discovered that the injury was more serious than thought.' 4 ' In all
..9 See note 124 supra. According to the Restatement, if the facts are
"doubtful" plaintiff assumes the risk. At least this is the implication. A
somewhat more liberal standard seems to be applied in release cases, since
plaintiffs in several cases have gained relief even though they must have
known when the release was executed that the future course of their re-
covery was "doubtful." See text preceding note 170 infra.
""Associated Employers Lloyds v. Aiken, 201 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1947).
' Ruggles v. Selby, 25 Ill. App. 2d 1, 165 N.E.2d 733 (1960) (as to the
wife, not the husband) ; Clancy v. Pacenti, 15 Ill. App. 2d 171, 145 N.E.2d
802 (1957); Fraser v. Glass, 311 Il. App. 336, 35 N.E.2d 953 (1941). The
plaintiff was apparently still in pain when he executed the release in Ozan
Graysonia Lumber Co. v. Ward, 188 Ark. 557, 66 S.W.2d 1074 (1934),
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of these cases a good argument could be made that the claimant as-
sumed the risk, even on the subjective standard applied by the
majority. Sometimes the argument is accepted in such circumstances,
particularly if the amount paid in compensation is more than
nominal,'42 or there is a question of liability which indicates that the
plaintiff is acting, not with reference to his injury or lack of it, but
with reference to the probable lack of liability.'43 In these cases the
release is held good and bars the plaintiff. Likewise, if the plaintiff
knows specifically of the possibility that the injury is worse than
thought, he may still intentionally take his chances in order to get an
immediate settlement.'44 In short, whether the plaintiff assumes the
risk becomes a question of fact in each case, though many courts
decide the question almost as though it were one of law.
2. Unforeseeable Consequences of a Known Injury. Most courts
say that in addition to the situation above discussed, there is a
separate and distinct situation. Our gangrene case is an example.
Patty knows she has a bruise and she knows it is not well when
she settles. Arguably, that alone is enough to indicate that she has
assumed the risk of further difficulty, but in the situation first dis-
cussed it is generally held otherwise. If, therefore, when Patty settles
for her bruised toe, it has already become infected with gangrene, the
settlement is no bar to further recovery, for she has not assumed
the risk of an unknown and serious injury-unless other facts
indicate a specific intention to do so. But suppose that Patty has a
bruised toe, and at the time of the settlement no infection has set in.
and Reed v. Harvey, 253 Iowa -, 110 N.W.2d 442 (1961). See also Doyle
v. Teasdale, 253 Wis. 328, 57 N.W.2d 381 (1953) (remanded to determine
whether the mistake was "mutual"). But cf. Nogan v. Berry, 188 A.2d
116 (Del. Super. 1963) in which summary judgment was rendered for the
defendant because at the time of the release the plaintiff was in pain plus the
fact that she told the defendant she was not hurt. On the same facts as
Nogan, but with a contrary result, is Casey v. Proctor, 28 Cal. Rptr. 307,
378 P.2d 579 (1963).
1,2 See, e.g., Viskovich v. Walsh-Fuller-Slattery, 16 App. Div. 67, 225
N.Y.S.2d 100 (1962).
"' See, e.g., Schoenfelt v. Buker, 262 Minn. 122, 114 N.W.2d 560
(1962). And, of course, there may be other reasons for settlement which
indicate that the settlement is not caused at all by any mistake, but by some
private desire of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Caudill v. Chatham Mfg. Co., 258
N.C. 99, 128 S.E.2d 128 (1962), where the plaintiff was in a hurry to settle
and pressuring his attorney to complete the matter. Whether plaintiff's un-
explained private desire to settle should alone be treated as negativing a
mistake seems at least arguable, however.
144 See Mack v. Albee Press, Inc., 263 App. Div. 275, 32 N.Y.S.2d 321
(1942), aff'd without opinion, 288 N.Y. 623, 42 N.E.2d 617 (1942).
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All Patty has at the moment is a bruise-and of that she is fully
aware. Suppose that the infection does not occur until after the
settlement is consummated. In this situation, most courts say she
has assumed the risk as a matter of law. 145 They put this conclusion
in several different ways: They say that any mistake that will relieve
Patty must be a mistake of fact. A mistake about what will happen in
the future is not a mistake of fact but only a mistake of prediction.
Hence, Patty cannot recover if the gangrene set in after the settle-
ment, but she can if it was present and unknown at the time of the
settlement. Another way of saying much the same thing is to say
that one assumes the risk-as a matter of law-of "unforeseeable
consequences of a known injury." Presumably this is so because
everyone must be taken to know that all sorts of medical problems
can develop from a known injury. At any rate the distinction is
made between a mistake as to the nature or extent of an injury
(diagnosis), and a mistake as to the future consequences of a known
injury (prognosis).
There are so many things wrong with this distinction that it is
easy to criticize, but it should be said that it very often results in a
just solution in this difficult area. Nevertheless, it is not consistent
with what the courts do in other cases. Plaintiffs often recover even
though at the time they settle they know their injuries have not
healed-a situation strongly suggesting an intentional assumption of
the risk and one involving just as much mistake in "prediction" as
the situation discussed here. Once the court is willing to look at the
intent of the parties as indicated by all circumstances instead of the
objective manifestation of intent embodied in the release, there is no
reason to set up a mechanical rule that distinguishes mistakes about
injuries from mistakes about consequences of injuries. If we are
looking at Patty's intent, it is just as clear that she did not intend to
assume the risk in one case as in the other. In both cases of course
she intended to assume some risk, but in neither did she intend to
assume the risk that her injuries were so bad that she would lose a
leg. It makes no difference in ascertaining Patty's intention whether
the infection came before or after the time of settlement: in neither
case did she intend to assume the risk.
Another difficulty with this distinction between injury and its
consequences is that, as some courts have pointed out, there is no
""See Note, 26 MIcH. L. Rzv. 828 (1928), criticizing such decisions
on the ground that the matter is essentially a question of fact.
(Vol. 41
1963] PERSONAL INJURY SETTLEMENTS 711
good way in many cases of separating the two. Suppose plaintiff
sustains a bruised back and settles for thirty dollars. A few weeks
later she finds she has kidney trouble as a result of the blow to her
back. Assuming that the kidney trouble did not develop until after
settlement, should it be regarded as a separate injury from the back
bruise and therefore as one for which relief should be granted? Or
should it be regarded as an "unforeseeable consequence of a known
injury," and therefore as a matter that does not justify relief? Or
should we simply assume that the injury to the kidney did exist at
the time of settlement? The Oklahoma court chose the last course.148
If a knee is injured should torn ligaments be regarded as con-
sequences of the known injury to the knee, or as unknown injuries?
The Arizona court thought there was an unknown injury.14 7
It seems obvious that any mistake about future possibilities of air
injury is a mistake pro tanto about the injury itself. If the present
injury, the bruise, will become infected and cause loss of a leg, the-
claimant seriously misunderstands the present injury itself if he fails.
to recognize the possibility of infection and loss of a leg. What a.
thing is is determined partly by what it does.1 48 Some courts seem
to have rejected the distinction between injury and its consequence
(or "fact and prediction") as merely involving a "verbal tech-
nique."' 49 Of course a rejection of the distinction does not imply
a rejection of the assumed risk argument; it merely means that
whether plaintiff assumed the risk or not is a question of fact to be
determined by looking at all the relevant circumstances.
In practice the rule that denies relief when the mistake is about
"consequences of a known injury" is much mitigated. For example,
in Ruggles v. Selby'80 the plaintiff, after settlement, developed a
1
,
8K. C. Motor Co. v. Miller, 185 Okla. 84, 90 P.2d 433 (1939).
,
7 Dansby v. Buck, 92 Ariz. 1, 373 P.2d 1 (1962).
..8 See Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 68 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934).
"" Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332, 86 N.W.2d 537 (1957). The Court
said: "It is said ... that we must distinguish between mistake of a material
past or present fact, and the mistake of prophecy or opinion concerning the
future. The existence of the former, it is said, will justify rescission (or
cancellation, or avoidance, or vacating) but not of the latter. Yet we may
well ask, as a practical matter (as distinguished from a verbal technique) is
it possible to completely divorce diagnosis from prognosis? Is there not an
interrelation, even not an interdependence? Is not a doctor's opinion as
to prospects of recovery a representation as to an existing factual situation
upon which all parties should be entitled to rely ?" Id. at 339, 86 N.W.2d at
540. Cf. Graham v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 176 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1949).
1. 25 IIl. App. 2d 1, 165 N.E.2d 733 (1960).
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speech defect. A brain operation revealed a subdural hematoma from
which he never recovered. He was relieved from his release, even
though the court recognized the rule about "consequences of known
injuries." The court regarded the mistake as one about the "nature
and extent" of the injury and not about its consequences. The reason
seems to be that the court thought of the hematoma as being in the
process of "development" at the time of settlement. In other words it
was an "existing" condition in some sense, and therefore came under
the rule about unknown injuries. The technique is basically to as-
sume without proof that the injury did in fact exist at the time
of settlement so as to come within the more liberal rule. Much the
same technique was used in an earlier Illinois case. 5 ' There the
plaintiff had suffered what appeared to be minor scratches and
bruises, but she was still suffering pain and having difficulty in
walking when the settlement was made. She accepted a settlement
which paid her thirty-three dollars for loss of time in addition to her
car damage and doctor bill. Later, the plaintiff discovered that her
pain was due to blood clots in her leg and that her injury was more
serious than anticipated. The defendant argued that there was no
mutual mistake because plaintiff's mistake was one about future
developments; there was no showing, he said, that the blood clots
existed at the time of the settlement. If they did not exist at the time
of the settlement, they were future developments or consequences of
.a known injury and there was no mistake. The court rejected the
:argument on the ground that "It cannot be doubted the infection
was present when the settlement was made, as shown by the swelling
.and pain .... " Thus the court gave the plaintiff an assist on the
:proof.
Sometimes courts introduce some related complications by dis-
tinguishing among these kinds of mistakes: as to the existence of an
injury; as to the nature and extent of the injury; as to the seriousness
-of the injury. Some seem to require a mistake as to the very existence
'of "the injury"; others seem willing to give relief for a mistake as to
the seriousness of the injury.'52 But these unneeded distinctions do
not often seem to be determinative in the courts' thinking of the
problem of relief or no relief, and perhaps they do not cause as much
trouble as they might.
.1 Fraser v. Glass, 311 Ill. App. 336, 35 N.E.2d 953 (1941).
. See Havinghurst, Effect Upon Settlements of Mutual Mistake as to
Injuries, 12 D.F. L.J. 1, 6 (1963).
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In all of these cases the better analysis would be simply the as-
sumed risk analysis. The question could be simply, "Did the claimant
assume the risk ?" This question applies to both the risk of unfore-
seen consequences of a known injury and the risk of unknown injury.
Since all courts do not really follow the distinction between diagnosis
and prognosis, further lip service merely adds to the confusion.
Factors in Recovery
However the assumed risk problem is dealt with, whether in
terms of an unknown injury or in terms of unforeseeable con-
sequences, all courts seem to agree that a number of factors are
involved in making the determination whether claimant assumed the
risk. If an "objective standard"-the written release-were used,
then of course, we could determine the "intent of the parties" by
simply examining that document. But since courts in fact are using
a subjective approach in which the claimant's personal intent or lack
of it is important, some means must be used to prevent relief in every
case. Since a claimant could always testify about his subjective
intent, this would create a jury case, unless we insist on some more
or less objective factors in the evidence (other than the release it-
self). These are numerous and no final list can be made, but some of
the important factors should be discussed.
1. Amount of Settlement. If the defendant paid a substantial sum
in settlement, there are reasons to hesitate in giving relief. 153 One is
that a substantial settlement indicates a fairly high probability that
plaintiff assumed the risk. It indicates serious injuries and probably
considerable investigation by the plaintiff. We should hesitate to
cancel releases for which substantial sums were paid.
2. Proportion of Settlement to Actual Injury.'54 A related con-
sideration is the proportion of the settlement sum to the actual money
value of the injury as ultimately understood. This is important for
... See Viskovich v. Walsh-Fuller-Slattery, 16 App. Div. 67, 225 N.Y.S.2d
100 (1962) (more than a "nominal amount" was paid, thus no relief given).
... This factor is sometimes ignored and relief is given in spite of a rela-
tively small differential between settlement and actual injury. See Ciletti
v. Union Pac. R.R., 196 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1952). It is, on the other
hand, apparently a factor in many cases which make no mention of it as
such. See, e.g., Ruggles v. Selby, 25 Ill. App. 2d 1, 165 N.E.2d 733 (1960)
(settlement turned out to be "grossly unjust"). The California court recently
said that the amount of consideration paid should be considered in propor-
tion to the amount of risk of unknown injuries, and so considered was a
factor in determining whether plaintiff assumed the risk of such injury.
Casey v. Proctor, 28 Cal. Rptr. 307, 378 P.2d 579 (1963).
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much the same reason indicated above. Perhaps this consideration
is even more important. If the plaintiff injures his back and settles for
3500 dollars, a fairly substantial sum, it still may turn out later that
he is paralyzed and will never work again. If he is paralyzed there
is no trouble in seeing that his mistake was a serious one. But if his
disability must be rated in terms of percentages, or in terms of pain
and suffering or in some other less concrete way, then we cannot
always be certain that his mistake was really very serious. If, in such
a case, however, a jury brings in a verdict of 50,000 dollars and this
is capable of being sustained, then we have a fairly concrete basis for
deciding that the mistake was serious enough to justify destroying
a compromise. Another way of saying the same thing, is to say that
in settling for 3500 dollars the claimant probably never intended to
assume such a vast risk.
If the difference between settlement and ultimate actual money
"value" of the injury is small, courts are not justified in spending
time on the case, in view of the desirability of compromise. Profes-
sor Havinghurst has pointed outi' 5 that the man who settles for
600 dollars and then recovers 1200 dollars when the release is set
aside actually profits nothing-the additional sum he received
probably went to his attorneys. When the injury is either not
serious at all or not grossly worse than the parties anticipated, there
is no good reason for setting aside the release.
3. Counsel.'56 If the plaintiff has counsel he is ordinarily well
advised of possibilities. Any experienced counsel is sedulous in
presenting claims for any possible injury. He will milk the defend-
ant's adjuster for every dime he can get on the basis of future loss of
earnings, future disability, future pain and suffering, and so on. Thus
it may be that where the plaintiff has counsel the amount he received
in settlement is partly in payment for future developments. This can-
not be safely treated as very weighty a consideration in all cases,
however. Defendant's insuror is not buying a pig in a poke; he is
1' Havingburst, Problens Concerning Settlement Agreements, 53 Nw.
U. L. REv. 283, 312 (1958).
... By inference, this is important in a number of cases involving both
misconduct and mistake. It is sometimes explicitly recognized as in
Viskovich v. Walsh-Fuller-Slattery, 16 App. Div. 67, 225 N.Y.S.2d 100
(1962). For similar reasons it is important to know whether the settlement
was negotiated or merely casual. Thus in Casey v. Proctor, 28 Cal. Rptr.
307, 378 P.2d 579 (1963), defendant's insuror settled by mail. In granting-
relief, the court emphasized, among other factors, that there was no negotia-
tion and bargaining.
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paying, if at all, for known injury plus fairly predictable or doubtful
future possibilities. If the future possibility is fairly predictable or in
doubt, then the claimant is assuming the risk. But he is not assuming
the risk as to really unanticipated future developments, regardless
of the presence of counsel or how much the insuror pays. Still, the
presence of counsel tends to assure the courts that plaintiff was well
advised, and probably tends to expand the limits within which re-
leases will be approved.
4. Claimant's Intelligence.5 ' The claimant's intelligence and ex-
perience are also important. If plaintiff is quite intelligent and
experienced he may appreciate a risk which an ordinary man would
not appreciate. If he does appreciate the risk, he may knowingly as-
sume it. The doctor who gets a bruised toe surely may be expected
more than a layman to appreciate the risk of gangrene.
5. Whether Liability Was in Issue. If, at the time of the settle-
ment, there was an issue of liability between the parties, the plaintiff
may be willing to accept what later appears to be a very small settle-
ment. This may be because the plaintiff fears that he will not do well
before a jury. If this is so, several reasons might be given for re-
fusing later to set aside the release. It might be said that this evidence
shows the plaintiff intended to assume the risk; or that he made no
mistake at all, since he may have recognized the possibility of future
difficulties and still decided to settle to avoid the liability problem; or,
that the mistake is not basic 5 ' and hence not sufficient for avoidance
of the settlement; or it might be said that the mistake was not
"Cmaterial," in the sense that it did not cause him to act. Whatever
the terminology, it must always be recognized that in spite of a
liability issue at the time of settlement, it is still possible that a
claimant may have made a mistake for which relief should be
granted. It is still possible that he would not have settled except for
a complete misestimate of his injury or its future course. Therefore,
the fact that liability was in issue, is, like the other matters discussed
in this section, only one factor to be considered.
It perhaps should be said that there may be related questions
which involve much the same points. It may be that liability was not
in issue but that, for reasons of his own, an adequately informed and
represented plaintiff still wishes to press for immediate settlement.
""Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332, 86 N.W.2d 537 (1957) ; Viskovich v.
Walsh-Fuller-Slattery, supra note 156.
"'Cf. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTIONS § 9 (1937).
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Again in such a circumstance, it may be that he acts to settle, not
so much because of a mistake as to his injury, but for some other
reasons of his own. If this can be established, then it may be said
that the plaintiff either made no mistake or that he assumed the risk.
It may be dangerous to say that a mistake about injury did not cause
the settlement, however. A mistake about the injury still may have
played a substantial part in the plaintiff's desire for immediate settle-
ment, even though he had other motives of his own. Perhaps the best
way of treating this problem is that of the RestatementW--by
asking whether the mistake is "basic" or not. If the plaintiff was
primarily motivated to settle by other reasons and was not con-
cerned with his injury, then the mistake would not be basic.
When the plaintiff settles largely because of an issue of liability,
that is, because he fears that he may lose his case if it is tried to
a jury or court, there is an especially sound reason for refusing him
relief. A settlement made under such circumstances is very likely as
just a settlement as can be made between the parties. The chance
that a court or jury could do any better justice is very slim indeed. If
plaintiff is represented by counsel (and perhaps this reasoning does
not apply unless he is) the chances are good that counsel on both
sides had very accurate estimates of the jury possibilities of the
case. Any later attempt to upset the settlement may often raise
serious doubts about the good faith of the plaintiff, though certainly
not always. Thus, more because of this reason than because of any
technical argument concerning assumed risk or the like, courts
should be most hesitant to upset settlements made where liability was
in issue and the plaintiff was represented by competent counsel. They
should not be rigid-but they should be as hesitant as the policy
indicates in the facts of the case.
This is an issue that ought to appear in the cases more often.
Defendants may perhaps be guilty of relying too heavily upon ob-
vious but unworkable approaches to this problem such as use of
language in the release which asserts (invariably) that liability is in
issue. But as has already been seen, the release language is only a
minor factor in any event.' There should be concrete evidence for
159 Ibid.
... It may be much more important in the trial court. One lawyer explained
that his personally drawn releases were printed in large letters, "FINAL
SETTLEMENT." He did not use the term "release," he said, because he
wanted something large enough for a jury to see and understand, so that
confusion with "receipt," often engendered by the word "release," could be
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the defendant that there was a genuine dispute over liability and that
such a doubtful liability issue was largely a motivating factor in the
plaintiff's decision to settle. Such proof is not easy, of course; but so
far as it can be obtained or inferred from facts available, it ought to
be in the record on appeal and it ought to be argued.
One way of proving that liability was in issue is to prove that the
plaintiff accepted less than his actual expenses, or that he accepted
a lump sum not based on actual expenses.-"1 Unfortunately this mode
of proving that liability was in issue does not always work and it
may be subject to conflicting inferences. For example, in one case
the defendant paid less than the actual expenses of the plaintiff, which
would presumably indicate that there was a serious issue of liability;
but the court -thought this meant that the plaintiff could not have
intended to assume the risks, since he received less than his actual
expenses. 1
6 2
Any other way of proving that liability was in issue should be
used, such as proof of negotiations between the parties or their
counsel. Proof that the plaintiff in the present suit actually paid
others in the same collision is usually good proof that he was actuated
by a desire to avoid liability and that, even had he known of his
injury, he would have settled anyway.' This conclusion is not in-
evitable, but it is likely in most cases.
If liability was not a question, this fact should work in the plain-
tiff's favor. Thus, if the plaintiff claims a given amount and is paid
the full amount claimed, there is an inference that the parties in-
tended full compensation for the plaintiff's injuries, whatever they
were, so that it is appropriate for the plaintiff to make additional
claims when he discovers additional injuries.6 4 Some courts have
apparently not adopted this reasoning and have flatly rejected the
notion that full settlement of a property damage claim, at least when
avoided. But in appellate courts, the language itself is not normally inter-
preted to mean what it says; the plaintiff does not assume the risks in spite
of language to that effect.
... Cf. Reed v. Harvey, 253 Iowa -, 110 N.W.2d 442 (1961) (discussing
and explaining earlier Iowa cases); Thomas v. Hollowell, 20 IIl. App. 2d
288, 155 N.E.2d 827 (1959) (no evidence of such, but court says it may
be in parties' minds anyway).
... Ruggles v. Selby, 25 IIl. App. 2d 1, 165 N.E.2d 733 (1960); but cf.
Thomas v. Hollowell, supra note 161.
... Schoenfeld v. Buker, 262 Minn. 122, 114 N.W.2d 560 (1962); cf.
Mensing v. Sturgeon, 210 Iowa 918, 97 N.W.2d 145 (1959).
" Casey v. Proctor, 28 Cal. Rptr. 307, 378 P.2d 579 (1963); Reed v.
Harvey, 253 Iowa -, 110 N.W.2d 442 (1961).
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not coupled with a personal injury claim, is any proof whatever that
full payment for injuries was intended. 65 These cases are dis-
tinguishable, however, and very likely right, because a defendant
often pays a full property damage claim of several hundred dollars
simply because investigation and negotiation is too expensive to
justify any other course. Hence a full payment of a property damage
claim, or even a small personal injury claim, does not necessarily
indicate an intent to pay for all of the plaintiff's injuries. Unless sub-
stantial amounts of money are involved, the defendant should not
suffer this adverse inference any more than the plaintiff should suffer
an adverse inference when he has accepted less than his full claim
where the amounts involved are relatively small.
6. Time of Settlement.'66 If the settlement takes place long after
the injury or after the apparent healing period, it will seem very
likely that the plaintiff had adequate opportunity to know his own
injury. Since disputes must end someday, we must leave some risk
upon the claimant. Thus courts are perhaps less likely to permit
avoidance of a release if the settlement was made after full op-
portunity for the plaintiff to know his own injury. The reason,
perhaps, is not so much an impatience with the claimant's ignorance
as it is a belief that he was not mistaken. All of the questions con-
cerning assumed risk and the parties' intent are vague indeed when
it comes to proof. A plaintiff who settles a year after his last
complaint, we suspect, very well knew his own condition when he
settled and further claims are probably not just ones.
7. Time of Bringing Suit. There are a number of defenses that
may be interposed if the plaintiff has delayed in bringing suit after
the settlement and they are discussed later.1 7 But delay is perhaps a
factor influencing decisions, apart from the legal doctrines involved
in such topics as laches, ratification, or limitation of actions. There
is always the possibility that the defendant has been prejudiced.
There is small chance that he is able to show it, but any lawyer
knows of the likelihood. If the release was procured through mis-
... Hutcheson v. Frito-Lay, 204 F. Supp. 576 (D. Ark. 1962); Casey v.
Proctor, supra note 164; Darensbourg v. Columbia Cas. Co., 140 So. 2d
241 (La. App. 1962); but cf. Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332, 86 N.W.2d
537 (1957).
'"Viskovich v. Walsh-Fuller-Slattery, 16 App. Div. 67, 225 N.Y.S.2d(1962). Cf. MD. CODE ANN. art. 79, § 11 (1957), releases signed within
five days of injury are voidable within sixty days at the plaintiff's option.
... See text accompanying notes 194-98 infra.
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take, not fraud, this chance should be weighed carefully. What is
perhaps more important, however, is this: it is very likely indeed
that there was no mutual mistake when the settlement was made, for
most settlements are made knowledgeably. And this likelihood in-
creases with time, for most mistakes are discovered in a fairly short
period. The chances are, therefore, good that there was no mistake
at all if the new suit was not brought until long after the settlement.
When this is considered in conjunction with the likelihood of
defendant's prejudice at delay, it seems apparent that there is not
a very good probability that a court deciding the matter much later
will have a chance of getting a more just result than that achieved
by the parties themselves.
On the other hand, if the plaintiff discovers his condition very
soon after the settlement, courts should be more willing to permit
avoidance of the release, even if other factors in the case are not
very favorable to the plaintiff. This is so because the chance of real
prejudice to the defendant is very slight indeed. This approach can
be pointed up in a very convincing fashion if we consider what
happens under a formal judgment (rather than a release). As we
have seen, a judgment may be set aside at common law in the judge's
discretion (with no provable reason at all) within the term time. 68
In addition, statutes often permit setting aside a judgment for serious
mistakes and set some more or less arbitrary limit, such as one
year. 9 If the claimant brings his suit within either of the times
applicable for setting aside judgments, perhaps that alone ought to be
enough to justify avoidance of the release. Surely a release should
not have any greater finality than a judgment rendered by a court
of record.
8. Form of Settlement.7 0 As already mentioned, a judgment is
ordinarily treated as a stronger document than a contract. But a
consent judgment is treated, for some purposes, like a contract only,
though is is given res judicata (and not merely contractual) effect. It
is probable that a settlement consummated by a judgment in some
form, is "stronger" or more final than a release. Such judgments are
seldom attacked on mistake grounds. One reason why judgments
"" See notes 11 & 40 supra.
lODE.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §1-220 (1953); cf. N.Y. R. Civ. PRAc.
5015(a)(1). Compare, MD. CODE ANN. art. 79, §11 (1957), where the
plaintiff is permitted to avoid a hasty release within sixty days.
1" See text Part II supra, discussing various forms which a settlement
may take.
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should be less susceptible to attack on grounds of mistake is that
they represent action by a court in some degree. In the case of
judgments, the mistake may well have to be "extrinsic," a matter
not required for attacking releases for mistake. The real reasons,
however, seem to be different. One is that counsel is usually present
and claimant has had the benefit of his efforts and advice. Formal
procedure eliminates haste and too-early settlements. Elements of
undue advantage are virtually gone from settlements made by judg-
ment. All in all the chances are very good that the parties considered
all angles of the case and decided for quite adequate reasons, that a
settlement ought to be made.
9. Language of the Release. As already indicated, the language
of the release itself is not given controlling weight. If it were, plain-
tiff's would never recover, for releases usually provide that they
cover all unknown injuries, future complications and almost every-
thing else. Indeed, release language today is so broad that a release
intended to cover one of two torts committed by a defendant may be
held to cover them both, though they are committed at widely
different times.171 Many courts do say, however, that the language
of the release is given some effect as evidence or as one factor in
deciding whether to give relief. Professor Havinghurst has com-
mended this view as leaving some measure of "freedom of contract"
to the parties. 2 It is sometimes difficult to ascribe much meaning to
a rule which would give unequivocal language of the release "some"
effect. It does not seem unduly rigid to suggest that either it means
what it says or that it means nothing at all. It is also difficult to see
much freedom of contract left when the parties are permitted to
write a clear provision into the contract only to find that it may be
treated as merely "one factor" and not as conclusive in the decision.
Even very liberal courts, on the other hand, have been able to con-
ceive situations in which the language of the release might be given
full effect.173  Presumably if the release specified in detail that it
. Cf. Merrimon v. Postal-Telegraph-Cable Co., 207 N.C. 101, 176 S.E.
246 (1934). But see Jeffreys v. Southern Ry., 127 N.C. 377, 37 S.E. 515
(1900).
' Havinghurst, supra note 152, at 12.
"'Thus in Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332, 86 N.W.2d 537 (1957), the
court said that the plaintiff, in signing the release, might say: "I may have
serious injuries I know nothing about. As to them I will take my chances."
Id. at 344, 86 N.W.2d at 542. The court also said, however, that such a state-
ment would be given effect only if that was in fact the claimant's intention.
Id. at 345, 86 N.W.2d at 543.
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covered certain injuries that were suspected, that would be enough.
But here the defendant would have a dilemma. If he provided in the
release that plaintiff was releasing any claims for unknown back
injuries, then plaintiff might turn up with an unknown brain
injury-and the inference from the specification in the release of
"back injuries" would undoubtedly be that unknown brain injuries
were not covered. Careful release drafting may indeed assist de-
fendants. But even if the court recognizes that release language may
be treated as one factor in the decision, that is seldom much comfort
for defendants, for it seems apparent from the cases that if it is a
factor, it is a minor one.
At various times and in various ways courts consider all these
factors and perhaps others not readily reducible to words in deter-
mining whether the plaintiff shall be relieved from his settlement.
These factors do not always relate directly to mutual mistake or
assumed risk, but they are all important in granting or denying
relief. A reading of the cases leaves one with the feeling that in all
too many of them adequate proof for both the plaintiff and defendant
has not been made on these issues. Other doubts creep in: if these
factors really are important, how can they possibly be assessed by a
jury, by people who have no means for judging the policy questions
involved? And an ever greater doubt: can the cases really be ex-
plained by "mutual mistake" as this article and most of the cases
have tried to do? Or isn't it, as some of these factors seem to sug-
gest, a matter of balancing the need for finality of settlements against
the need for justice?
The Rationale of Relief
The basic theory for relief in such cases as we have discussed in
this part is that there was a mutual mistake and that the plaintiff
did not intentionally assume the risk of such a mistake. This
rationale may explain many cases, but it does not seem adequate in
those cases where the risk is clearly assumed, a unilateral mistake
is involved, or where the court bases its decision on policy factors.
1. Difficulties With Mutual Mistake. In many cases it seems
clear that the plaintiff has assumed the risk of mistake. Even when a
rather subjective approach to this question is used, a claimant who
knows he is still in pain and is still malfunctioning, surely assumes
the risk that he is not well and that he may never get well. A woman
sustains an eye injury. Her doctor tells her she is well and she settles.
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But even at the moment her doctor assures her that she is well, she
admittedly knows better, for she is still having difficulty with her
vision. She must be aware that her doctor is wrong. Yet the court
said she had not assumed the risk. 74 There are, of course, a number
of cases essentially contrary in spirit. But there are also other cases
which have permitted plaintiffs to avoid releases given while they
are still in pain and obviously not well." 5 They surely have made no
mistake. They surely have compromised their claim to future
developments. And yet relief may be granted. Mutual mistake
cannot explain such results.
Doctrine has it that there is no relief for a purely unilateral mis-
take. In some cases this doctrine is given effect. For example, the
plaintiff may not intend to include unknown injury in his settlement,
but the defendant most certainly does; he knows perfectly well that
future trouble will develop in some cases and that is why he wishes
to settle-for future injuries as well as ones now known. Thus the
defendant does not mistakenly assume that the only injuries are
the ones now known. He assumes, on the contrary, that there is
some likelihood that plaintiff will have some further trouble not
now known. He makes no mistake, though the plaintiff may. Such
a situation was presented in Doyle v. Teasdale"' There plaintiff,
who had been examined by his own doctor and who had been treated
for back pain, executed a release of all claims, including future
difficulties. He later discovered an injury to his coccyx in the low
back, a good deal lower than the source of his previous pain. He
brought suit and the trial court set aside the release. On appeal the
defendant argued that the release should not be set aside because
the mistake was not mutual. He argued that he settled for a
"sprained back" which included a sprained back all the way down to
""Associated Employers Lloyds v. Aiken, 201 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1947).
"' See cases cited note 141 supra, and Prince v. Kansas City So. Ry. 229
S.W.2d 568 (Mo. 1950), where a plaintiff relied on a doctor's statement that
his symptoms resulted from a hernia operation, though he knew he had the
symptoms prior to the operation. Relief was granted. See note 70 supra.
See also Warren v. Crockett, 364 S.W.2d 352 (Tenn. 1963) (plaintiff knew
there might be further trouble).
"263 Wis. 328, 57 N.W.2d 381 (1953). See also, Havinghurst, supra
note 152, at 10. Professor Havinghurst concludes that such an argument-
that the defendant was not mistaken-is not a good tactical line for the
defense. If he is right, as this writer thinks, then it can hardly be said as
a practical matter that "mutual" mistake is required as a prerequisite to relief
in release cases.
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the coccyx. Whatever the plaintiff may have meant in settling for
a sprained back, he, the defendant, meant to include the whole back,
including the coccyx. The plaintiff may have assumed he would have
no further trouble; but the defendant made no such error. The court
on appeal agreed with the defendant. A coccyx was a part of the
back, it reasoned, and if it had been sprained, it was covered by the
release. Any mistake on the part of the plaintiff was unilateral.
A case like Doyle v. Teasdale hews to the doctrinal line that the
mistake must be mutual. But it is unusual in this respect. What was
said in Doyle could have been said in almost any case, namely that
the defendant made no mistake. Defendant, through experienced
adjusters or lawyers, knows very well that there will likely be further
complaints. He does not often assume that plaintiff's only medical
problem is the one he knows about at the moment. If the plaintiff
believes he will have no further trouble, his mistake is unilateral in
this sense. Yet in case after case where this was surely true, relief
is granted. That is clearly not consistent with a mutual mistake
analysis, for at least in the sense involved in Doyle v. Teasdale, the
mistake is only unilateral.r
Sometimes courts granting relief attack the unilateral mistake
problem in another way. They say that either there was a mutual
mistake or there was fraud by the defendant. If the plaintiff believed
he knew his total injury and the defendant knew better, the mistake is
unilateral, perhaps, but there is fraud on defendant's part in not
advising plaintiff. If the defendant did not know better, the mistake
is mutual.' But this reasoning cannot be applied to a case like
Doyle. The defendant has concealed nothing, has misrepresented
nothing. Indeed the release itself indicates that the defendant is
""' Since this text was written the Supreme Court of California recog-
nized the point here in slightly different language: "Although most of the
decisions are couched in terms of 'mutual mistake,' this rationale does not
satisfactorily explain the case holdings. Invariably, the release has been
drafted by the releasee in terms sufficiently broad to include a discharge
of liability for unknown injuries. While the releasee is ignorant of the
existence of injuries, he is also indifferent to their existence. He seeks a
discharge of liability in any event, and it cannot be said that he would not
have entered into the release had he actually known of them." Casey v.
Proctor, 28 Cal. Rptr. 307, 315, 378 P.2d 579, 587 (1963).
This is a favorite attack on the problem, especially where the de-
fendant's doctor has made an innocent representation. See, e.g., Ciletti v.
Union Pac. R.R., 196 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1952). Applied to such a situation
the analysis which pins the defendant on either fraud or mutual mistake
makes sense. See, using this approach also, Malina, Unilateral Mistake of
Fact in Personal Injury Releases, 10 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 70 (1961).
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concerned about possible future medical difficulty, since it usually
specifically provides that such developments are settled by the
release."' So in a case like Doyle the defendant is not committing
fraud and has not made a mistake. There are many other cases in
which reasoning like that in Doyle might be applied, and yet relief
is granted for "mutual" mistake. It would seem that the court in
Doyle took the requirement of mutual mistake too literally.
There is a third reason why the mutual mistake analysis is some-
times unsatisfying. It is that the courts are often considering or
appear to be considering policy issues unrelated to mutual mistake.
And mutual mistake is not a good doctrinal theory which aids
courts in getting at the real policy issues. For example, there is al-
ways the possibility that the voluntary settlement of the parties is the
best and fairest adjustment that can be made. A mutual mistake
analysis does not offer a tool for considering this possibility at all.
Other issues-for example the question of whether liability was in
issue at the time of settlement-may relate to mutual mistake. But
the contrary inferences to be drawn from such issues on the mutual
mistake point leave it doubtful how much bearing such issue will
have-on that point.
Behind the facade of mutual mistake the courts are going about
the work of adjusting, the best they can, the "equities" of the un-
fortunate situation. Mutual mistake, at least in the technical sense,
has little to do with their decisions. To be sure, there must be a
mistake in some sense-plaintiff's injuries were worse than he
thought. But it is not necessarily a mistake in the legal sense that
the plaintiff's state of mind was at odds with the facts, for the plain-
tiff may well have known the possibility of future medical complica-
tions, or assumed the risk, and still get relief. Further, many cases
grant relief where an analysis similar to the Doyle case could have
been used to show that the mistake was only unilateral. Finally,
mutual mistake, is not a good vehicle for reaching the real issues-
and issues which courts actually consider. If mutual mistake is not
a good analysis, is there any better?
2. Alternatives to Mutual Mistake. Some courts seem to be
working toward a new and different rationale for relief. What that
rationale will be, if it is ever achieved, is far from clear, but it looks
as if it might discard mutual mistake and assumed risk altogether and
"' Hence, also, there is a manifestation of assent required for a contract
which, in other contexts, would normally bind the plaintiff.
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seek new ways for drawing the line between relief and no relief.
Ruggles v. Selby179 is a case which may indicate such an effort. Its
basic facts are rather similar to most release cases and the court
granted relief. It made its obeisance to the mutual mistake approach,
but it also said:
The trend in most states ... is to apply to releases a doctrine
of liberality with respect to the attempts of injured parties to
set aside release or settlement agreements which subsequently
prove to be grossly unfair and unjust. . . . The trend ... in
those situations where the facts, when finally known, present
an unconscionable result, is due in large measure to the fact
that these are matters for the chancellor in equity who is
vested with that degree of discretion and flexibility necessary
to the doing of justice under the circumstances of each indi-
vidual case."'8
It could hardly be more certain that the court was not concerned
with mutual mistake. It is rather concerned with the total un-
desirability of the end result, which it labels "unconscionable." It is
worth noticing that the "unconscionable result" does not imply
unconscionable conduct of the defendant; what this court is saying
is that the result alone, if extreme, is sufficient to justify rescission.
And this is true in a release case though a mere unconscionable
result alone would not justify the chancellor in rescinding an
ordinary contract.
In an earlier case..1 from the same jurisdiction the court ex-
pressed a similar dissatisfaction with a pure mutual mistake ap-
proach. "[N] o rationale has been formulated for the special treat-
ment of such cases," the court said. But the court thought that the
main thing involved was that the human body was more than "an
article of commerce." And, as to assumed risk, the court said that
men may be aware that a scratch may lead to a malignancy, but "a
man cannot and does not live in dread of these possibilities. He
accepts assurances that all will be well, even though ultimate con-
.sequences cannot be appraised as in matters involving property or
services."
The Michigan Court put it more simply: "We exist solely to do
17D25 Ill. App. 2d 1, 165 N:E.2d 733 (1960).
801 r. at -, 165 N.E.2d at 739.
... Clancey v. Pacenti, 15 Ill. App. 2d 171, 145 N.E.2d 802 (1957).
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justice and it shall be done."' 2 The opinion of the Michigan Court is
an impressive one, but of course it is not true that courts exist solely
to do justice-they also have obligations to society at large to
fashion workable rules for the ongoing of the world's business. It
may be a bit too simple to say that it is simply a matter of justice
in each case. But in any event these cases express, guardedly perhaps,
a dissatisfaction with the mutual mistake approach.
The language of the cases just quoted seems to indicate what
might be considered an "equitable" or "humanitarian" approach.
There is another, though similar approach, which has already been
mentioned. That approach might be called, if it must be called
anything, a policy approach. It differs, perhaps, from the "humani-
tarian" approach just described in that its primary focus is not upon
the plaintiff's injuries, but rather upon the whole multitude of
problems involved. This, in some respects, is what courts are
generally doing, but their task is sometimes complicated because
they must write, and perhaps think, in terms of mutual mistake.
The fundamental policies involved are those mentioned before:
(1) We should like to see settlements made as final as possible, not
only for social convenience, but also because they represent what is
apt to be a fair disposition of the matter in many cases; (2) The tort-
feasor, not the victim, or society, should pay for the damage caused.
Neither of these policies is related to mutual mistake and that is why
it is difficult to deal with these cases in terms of mutual mistake.
Another way to look at these policies-and a way which
incidentally should lay to rest the ghost of "freedom of contract"-is
suggested by Judge Frank. 8 3 In tort law contract is not very im-
portant because the relationship between plaintiff and defendant, or
victim and wrongdoer, is not based on contract but on "status"-a
relationship recognized and imposed by law, much against the will
of the defendant in most cases. There is no reason, except one of
convenience, to permit that status to be terminated or altered
significantly by contract. The reason of convenience speaks loudly,
because we do generally want disputes settled; but it need not speak
with authoritative finality. The law that created the status between
victim and torifeasor need not wither away merely because, for
convenience, the parties have tried to make a contract. There are, of
... Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332, 86 N.W.2d 537 (1957).
...Hume v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 121 F.2d 336 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 684 (1941).
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course, many such status relationships which we do not permit to be
influenced by contract. Husband and wife relationships cannot be
terminated by contract, nor can parent-child relationships. There
is no reason to fear the fall of society if the same is said about the
relationship between tortfeasor and victim. The fact that the parties
have made a contract, then, is relatively unimportant. What is im-
portant is that disputes should be settled and settled finally-but
not necessarily so if that settlement relieves a wrongdoer from an
obligation which the law has imposed upon him.
This approach is not predicated upon personal wrongdoing. It
applies equally to defendants whose only liability is respondeat
superior or is imposed without fault, as for blasting or ultrahazard-
ous activities. The point is not that the defendant is a bad man, but
that the law has for its own reasons seen fit to create for him a status
from which he ought not to escape except under conditions permitted
by the law in the light of all relevant considerations. Perhaps it is
sometimes unjust to hold defendants liable; if so, the substantive rule
ought to be changed, but as long as the law does impose liability, we
need not be concerned if the defendant does not escape it as readily
as he likes-except, again, where the convenience of finality out-
weighs the convenience in making the tortfeasor pay. What has
been said here, therefore, applies not only to negligent or intentional
wrongdoers but also to any person upon whom the law imposes a
tort liability.
With these policies in mind, a somewhat more organized attack
can be made on the problem presented by the injured victim who has
settled too soon. The first step in such an attack should be to review
the factors discussed above-the time of bringing suit, the amount of
money paid, and so on. An assessment of these factors should make
some reasonable weighing of the policies involved possible. Review
of all those factors is not necessary here, but two may be singled out
as of extreme importance.
The first is the question of money. How much was the claimant
paid and what proportion is it of his "real" injury? Is the difference
gross and "unconscionable?" Is it so great that it substantially
violates the principle of liability for fault, the principle that the
tortfeasor should pay? In most cases this is the really important
thing.'8 4  Perhaps this much is indicated by the North Carolina
"" Cf. Morris & Paul, The Financial Impact of Automobile Accidents,
110 U. PA. L. REv. 913 (1962), concluding that economic loss of $800 or
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authorities which say that "fraud" is shown if the settlement sum
was unconscionably small. We cannot, of course, hope for much
predictability on this factor. How much is "great" or how little is
"small" no one can say. But we can say that an obviously insub-
stantial difference between settlement sum and ultimate recovery
ought not to justify relief. As Professor Havinghurst has pointed
out,'85 it is bootless to permit a plaintiff who settled for 6,500
dollars to reopen litigation when his injuries are only 10,000
dollars. 8 since he will profit little or not at all from the additional
recovery due to further expenses of litigation.
Upon the question of money differential between settlement and
actual injuries, courts have apparently been much impressed. One way
the difference is known to the court is through a jury verdict. If the
trial court permits the plaintiff's claim to go to the jury and an award
is made, the appellate court has a concrete measuring rod. For ex-
ample, the plaintiff was paid 500 dollars in settlement and the jury,
on avoidance of the release, brought in a verdict for 5,000 dollars. It
is fairly obvious that the mistake was serious enough to justify
relief. When the question of relief or no relief is a close one, therefore,
it seems desirable that a finding be made on the damages point if
that is possible. Even if a jury is not used and the question is brought
up in an equitable action for rescission rather than in a trial on the
merits of the claim, a trial judge should have the benefit of some
limited testimony bearing on damages, so that he can estimate the
probable extent of plaintiff's true injury and thus furnish a measur-
ing rod with which the appellate court can determine the extent of
the injury.
The second factor for emphasis is that the defendant may not
have been a tortfeasor at all. The policy justifying relief is largely
the policy that the tortfeasor should pay. But if the defendant is not
a tortfeasor at all, that is another matter again. Yet, when full injury
is known, he will likely seem to be a tortfeasor in the jury's eyes
even if at the time of the settlement no one would have thought so.
more was the crucial figure of shock for most families. Losses of less than
this amount, those writers felt, could be absorbed without really serious
disruption of the family.
o Havinghurst, supra note 155.
's Ciletti v. Union Pac. R.R., 196 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1952). Possibly the
$10,000 recovery was in excess of the $6,500 paid on the release, however. If
the decision is based on fraud, relief ought to be given without regard to
the amounts involved.
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More important, delay in reaching the courtroom because of a
settlement may have prejudiced the defendant seriously on this issue.
But for lost evidence the defendant might have shown that he was
free from fault. The time element thus becomes of great importance.
If the plaintiff presents his claim a long time after settlement, even
though he is within the statute of limitations, this factor alone
should have great weight in upholding the settlement. This is so, as
already mentioned, not only because of prejudice to the defendant,
but because as time goes on and proof is lost, and witnesses forget,
there is an ever greater possibility that the original settlement was a
better adjustment than the court can now, at this late date, make.
Whatever analysis is used on these "mistake" cases, all the
factors must be considered and assessed. And there is no easy nor
predictable way to the results any more than there is on any other
"fact" question.8 7 In a good many cases it can be found that the
policy of finality must bow to the policy that makes the tortfeasor
pay, and that decision must be made anew in each case.
Other Mistakes
The discussion of the mistake problem has thus far involved
mistakes by the plaintiff as to his injury. He can, however, make
other kinds of mistakes, 88 and substantially the same principles
should apply. For example, the plaintiff may believe he is signing a
receipt rather than a release.'8 9 A mistake of this sort is apt to be
serious but it does not necessarily justify relief. If it is non-
negligent it may prevent the formation of a contract at all-that is,
there may be no "meeting of the minds," or to speak "objectively,"
no mutual manifestation of assent. In such a case, ordinary contract
doctrines may control. But it is also possible that a contract was
formed in the objective sense, that is, that defendant reasonably
believed from plaintiff's actions that plaintiff had agreed to sign a
release. In that event, plaintiff may be denied recovery on the simple
... Whether judge or jury should decide mistake cases is discussed in
Part VI infra.
... The classification used in Keefe, Validity of Releases Executed Under
Mistake of Fact, 14 FoRD. L. REv. 135 (1945), is generally used: mistakes
as to the nature of the instrument, mistakes as to the content of the instru-
ment, and mistakes of fact leading to the execution of the instrument, as for
example, mistakes concerning the plaintiff's injury.
... E.g., Miller v. Judice, 149 So. 2d 715 (La. App. 1963).
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ground that the mistake was unilateral, not mutual. 90 On the other
hand, if the defendant knew of plaintiff's mistake and said nothing,
he is guilty of fraud or at least misconduct sufficient to justify avoid-
ance of release. Behind these doctrines is again the same desire to
make settlements final. They need not be as final as judgments, but
they do need to be as final as civilized justice may permit. If the
plaintiff is negligent, the settlement might well be permitted to stand,
as it usually is where plaintiff failed to read the release. This is so,
not because he is guilty of a wrong, but because he and only he is
responsible for the situation and he should not be permitted to
increase the chaos of re-opened settlements if he could reasonably
have prevented such a situation. This means we are not concerned
with the plaintiff's "negligence" as it is ordinarily defined, for that
embodies an objective standard of conduct. What we ought to be
concerned with is whether this plaintiff could reasonably be expected
to have avoided the misunderstanding. A second reason why a
"negligent" plaintiff should not be permitted to avoid his release
due to his own misunderstanding is that he probably did understand
it. If, after reading it and asserting at the time of settlement that
he understood it, he later asserts he did not understand it, we are
inclined to believe he told the truth the first time. Of course, evidence
in a particular case may show otherwise, but standing alone, his
recent admission to stupidity does not warrant much faith.
If the plaintiff is, for some reason, justified in his mistake-if it
is a reasonable one for him to have made, given his intelligence and
experience-then the factors discussed above ought to be considered.
Was the mistake serious enough to warrant re-opening the dispute?
Did the plaintiff delay? And so on. There may be more certainty
in cases where the mistake is one about the nature of the paper signed,
because such mistakes are often "negligent." But though it may be
a relief to find such relative certainty, the task of judging in each
case the value of finality as against the value of justice cannot be
fairly avoided.
V. BAsic DEFENSES
The finality of settlements is much enhanced by several defenses
that may prevent relief to the plaintiff. As in the case of "mutual
mistake," there are doctrines governing some of these defenses that
' See on the whole subject, the concurring opinion of Judge Frank in
Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1946).
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may not always relate directly to the real questions involved-the
need for finality and the need for justice between the parties.
Delay in Seeking Relief
1. Statutes of Limitation. Suppose a plaintiff is injured in 1950
and has three years under the applicable statute in which to bring
his claim. In 1952 he settles with the defendant, both parties being
mistaken as to the seriousness of the plaintiff's injury. In 1954, after
the statute has run, plaintiff discovers that his injury is worse
than he originally believed. May he be relieved of his mistake and
prosecute his original claim? If the release was procured by the
defendant's fraud, the statute might be tolled' and plaintiff per-
mitted to recover. But there may not be a good reason for such
a result when mere mistake is involved, and perhaps the answer is
simply that the statute of limitations has run and plaintiff is barred.
Whatever the answer is, it must be the same regardless of the
procedure plaintiff uses for attacking the release and seeking re-
covery. If he brings suit at law on the claim for his personal injury,
the defendant will normally plead the release as a defense; if the
statute has run, the defendant will also plead the statute of limitation.
The plaintiff can not circumvent such an answer by suing in equity
to rescind. It is true that equity courts often do not feel bound by
the statute of limitations, and the defense of laches would not be
good absent delay in prosecuting a known right. Even so, equity
could not solve the whole problem, for even if the plaintiff were not
barred from equitable relief by the statute of limitations, he would
still be barred when, after rescission of the release, he sought to
recover on the original personal injury claim-a claim at law that
is barred by the applicable statute even if equity rescinds the release.
Thus whether the plaintiff proceeds at law or in equity, the answer
must ultimately be the same.
What the answer is, however, is not entirely clear. Sometimes
there is talk of tolling the statute of limitation for mistake as well as
for fraud, but there seems no pressing reason for such a result; and it
is clear that the plaintiff who mistakenly assumes he is not injured
9' This will not always be so. Presumably, unless the fraud amounts to
a concealment of a cause of action, the statute of limitations will not be
tolled. In such a situation, the plaintiff might well turn to the tort action
of deceit. Certain statutes of limitation are construed to prevent any tolling.
See Wichita Falls & S.R.R. v. Durham, 132 Tex. 143, 120 S.W.2d 803
(1938).
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and does not settle at all, is barred at the end of the statutory period.
Because he would be barred at the end of the limitation period if he
made no settlement, it is tempting to argue that the plaintiff who
does make a settlement under a mistake as to his injury should be
in no better position. The arguments seems to be a sound one.1 2
It might be argued, however, that when the plaintiff settled under
a mistake he was lulled to sleep; that if he had not settled at all, he
might well have brought his action within the limitation period and
might have made no mistake about his injuries. This argument
should be given weight-but only if it has substantial proof to back
it up. If the plaintiff proves that he was lulled to sleep, that he
would probably have brought his action within the limitation
period but for the mistake, and that he would at that time have
recognized the true extent of his injury, he might well be permitted
relief. But unless he makes such proof, the mistaken plaintiff ought
to be barred by the statute along with the plaintiff who has not
settled at all.
There are in some states special statutes of limitation applicable
to a "cause of action" for mistake.193 It seems clear that these have
no application to a compromise settlement situation. Even if the
plaintiff might get relief from the release because he seeks it within
the time specified in the "mistake" statute of limitation, he would
still be faced with the statute of limitation applicable to his original
cause of action. It is possible to argue that if the plaintiff brings
his action for relief under the mistake statute of limitation, that
should carry with it relief from the limitation on his original cause
of action. Another way to say the same thing is to argue that when
the legislature permits relief from a mistake within three years after
discovery of the mistake, it means to give full relief. The plaintiff
should be restored to his original position, the argument runs, and
that includes his original position vis-A-vis the statute of limitations
on the personal injury claim. Perhaps such an argument might be
successful in an extreme case, but it would permit a great lapse of time
between original injury and ultimate disposition of the claim. Such
a great lapse of time would indicate a high probability of prejudice
to the defendant and a small probability that the plaintiff's claim is
9' This seems to be the court's approach in Johnson v. Chicago, M. &
S.P. Ry., 224 Fed. 196 (D. Wash. 1915).13E.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. § 12-543 (1956); CaL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 338;
IDAHO CODE § 5-218(1) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52 (1953).
[Vol. 41
PERSONAL INJURY SETTLEMENTS
really justified. It seems likely, therefore, that when the original
statute of limitations has run, the mistaken plaintiff will be barred.
2. Laches and Delay. Even if the statute of limitations has not
run, the plaintiff's delay in seeking relief from his release may bar
him. If his suit is in equity, the doctrinal tool used by the defendant
will ordinarily be laches-the plaintiff's delay in enforcing a known
right and resulting prejudice to the defendant.194 The same result
should obtain if the plaintiff sues directly on his claim for personal
injury at law and the defendant pleads the release as a bar.195 Laches
will not generally be found unless there is actual prejudice to the
defendant, the plaintiff has discovered his mistake, and thereafter
delayed unreasonably. 196 Apart from the equitable doctrine of laches,
however, there is good reason to bar relief for delay that might not
constitute laches. Thus unreasonable delay in avoiding a trans-
action after the plaintiff knows the true facts may be enough to bar
relief apart from laches even if no prejudice to the defendant is
shown-provided it is "likely" that there was such prejudice.197
Under either the doctrine of laches or the doctrine of "delay," there
is some fault on the part of the plaintiff-he must have delayed un-
reasonably.
3. Innocent delay, with prejudice to defendant. Suppose the
plaintiff settles and later, within the statute of limitation, discovers
his injuries are far more serious than he thought at the time of
settlement. Suppose further that as soon as he discovers his mistake,
he brings an action, so that he cannot be charged with unreasonable
delay. Even under these circumstances the defendant may be
prejudiced. Witnesses may have died or may have forgotten im-
portant details. Prejudice may result in many other less obvious
"" See generally MCCLINTOx, EQUITY 71 (2d ed. 1948); Friedman,
Delay as a Bar to Rescission, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 426 (1941).
.. See Aronovitch v. Levy, 238 Minn. 237, 56 N.W.2d 570 (1953), recog-
nizing laches in a legal action where plaintiff brought suit on the original
tort and defendant pleaded the release. Friedman, supra note 194, deals
separately with the defense of laches and that of delay, as does the Restate-
ment of Restitution. See RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 64 (delay), § 68
(ratification), and § 148 (laches) (1937).
"'3 Laches was found without any showing of prejudice to the defendant
where the statute of limitations had run in Johnson v. Chicago, M. & S.P. Ry.,
224 Fed. 196 (D. Wash. 1915).
"'TRESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 64 (1937). Compare the section on
laches, § 148, which requires a proceeding in equity and speaks of actual
hardship to the defendant, not merely the likelihood of such hardship. See,
discussing the difference, Friedman, supra note 194.
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and less tangible ways woefully familiar to any defense lawyer. Is
this kind of prejudice-for which the plaintiff is not responsible-
enough to bar relief? The normal doctrines of laches and delay do
not apply. The cases do not suggest much help for the defendant
here. Perhaps the reason is that when the plaintiff settles, both
parties necessarily run the risk of mistake and the risk that, if there
is a mistake, testimony may have evaporated without anyone's fault.
This is a risk to the plaintiff as well as to the defendant. If the
plaintiff's testimony is lost, as it sometimes will be, he is not for that
reason alone permitted to rescind where rescission would otherwise
be denied. The defendant should be in no better position on that
issue than the plaintiff; he should not be permitted to avoid a re-
scission that would otherwise be granted merely because testimony
has been lost. Each party must run his own risks of prejudicial
change in the circumstances.
This reasoning, however, does not necessarily apply where the
defendant has lost testimony relating to his status as a tortfeasor.
The basic reason for permitting avoidance of the release in many
cases is that the tortfeasor should not escape the liability the law
has imposed upon him. But this assumes he was in fact a tortfeasor,
legally liable in the first instance. Of course this is not always so.
Many defendants choose to settle and take a release from the plaintiff,
not because they are guilty, but because a settlement is more expedient
and cheaper than trial. The defendant who settles quickly may very
well avoid making the investigation he would otherwise have made.
He may lose testimony that will show he is not, in fact, a tortfeasor
at all. If this is so it would be unfair to make the innocent de-
fendant run the risk of losing evidence as to the liability. It would
serve no policy of the law to do so. Lost evidence on the damages
is one thing; but lost testimony as to the defendant's liability in the
first instance is something else altogether. If, therefore, the de-
fendant can offer reasonably convincing evidence to show that he is
prejudiced by innocent delay on the issue of liability, no relief should
be granted the plaintiff. Of course, the defendant can never prove
his original defense, for if he could, there would be no prejudice.
It should be enough that he shows a reasonable likelihood that he
has been seriously prejudiced on the liability issue. The policy
favoring finality of settlements should weigh enough in the balance
to protect the defendant in this situation. 9 '
' In Allison v. Chicago Great W. Ry., 240 Minn. 547, 62 N.W.2d 374
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4. Affirmance and Ratification. Apart from statutes of limita-
tion or prejudicial delay, the plaintiff may also delay in such a way
as to indicate that he intends to be bound by the release-to affirm
it."9' This may be done by any words or conduct that indicate such
a choice. If a plaintiff accepts or retains benefits of the settlement
after knowledge of his mistake or of the fraud, this will be sufficient
to indicate an affirmance of the transaction-provided a normal per-
son would have repudiated the transaction earlier."' It is, therefore,
important that the plaintiff act as quickly as possible when he finds,
or suspects, a serious mistake or fraud. On the other hand, it must
always be remembered that mistakes of a medical nature may dawn
slowly. Since rescission would not be allowed for a trivial mistake,
the plaintiff is entitled to sufficient time to realize not only that he
mistook his injury, but also that he made a serious mistake. °1
The doctrines of affirmance, laches, and delay are often good
tools for achieving justice between the parties. But they do not
always permit sufficient flexibility to effectuate the policy of finality
in settlements. In all release cases involving mistake it should be
(1954), one of the doctors who had treated plaintiff and on whose testimony
defendant relied had died. Defendant urged that its position was therefore
prejudicially changed and relief should be denied. The court did not discuss
specifically the effect of the death of the doctor; the plaintiff was granted
relief. In Aronovitch v. Levy, 238 Minn. 237, 56 N.W.2d 570 (1953), two
of the doctors on whom defendant relied in settling had died. The court held
it was error to submit an issue of laches since there had been no unreasonable
delay by the plaintiff after discovering his mistake.
.00 See RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 68 (1937); Friedman, supra note
194.
200 RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 68, comment b (1937). See Presnell
v. Liner, 218 N.C. 152, 10 S.E.2d 639 (1940) (plaintiff spent a part of the
settlement money after learning of the alleged fraud of defendant). But the
plaintiff must be aware of the mistake before he can be charged with an
affirmance. K. C. Motor Co. v. Miller, 185 Okla. 84, 90 P.2d 433 (1939).
In Miller v. Judice, 149 So. 2d 715 (La. App. 1963), plaintiff thought the
release was only a receipt for payments to date and this was reasonable.
However, plaintiff thereafter endorsed checks which contained an un-
equivocal release. This was held not to bar plaintiff's claim of mistake as
to the original release even though the checks contained a clear statement
that they were in full payment and for final settlement, since, thereafter,
defendant sent further checks for further claims. Presumably, if the issue
had been raised immediately after plaintiff's signature on the check and
before the other checks were sent, "ratification" or affirmance would have
been found. And presumably the transaction is now un-ratified. Cf. the
case of the good man who, having scratched out his eyes in the bramble
bush, went back to scratch them in again. Nevertheless, the case seems
correct because it comports with the actual agreement of the parties, as
evidenced by subsequent payments from the defendant.
.0. See Union Pac. R.R. v. Zimmer, 197 P.2d 363 (Cal. App. 1948).
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remembered that delay is one factor (though no more than that) in
deciding whether the plaintiff should be given relief. It should be
a factor even if none of the technical doctrines mentioned can be
invoked. This is so not merely because the defendant may be
prejudiced. It is so because if the alleged mistake is not brought
to light soon after settlement, the chances of a court's doing justice
are slight. It is so because if the mistake is not litigated soon after
settlement it is reasonably likely that no mistake was made, or that
it is not serious enough to warrant disruption of the final settlement.
Thus courts should not feel unduly limited by the doctrines of delay
and affirmance. In any case the decision should be made for relief
only after the factor of delay is considered as one factor among others.
Tender
It is sometimes stated as a general rule that as a prerequisite to
rescission the plaintiff must tender to the defendant whatever he
received in the transaction-that is, he must put the defendant back
in the position that existed prior to the transaction by returning the
money or other consideration received.202 There are so many excep-
tions to this principle," 3 that its generality may be doubted. All
of the exceptions cannot be reviewed here, but it should be sufficient
to indicate the main lines of thought involved in the requirement of
tender.
One, and perhaps the main, reason for the requirement is to pre-
vent the plaintiff's unjust enrichment. He should not keep what he
received in settlement and also be allowed a full recovery. If he sued
at law on his original tort action, the theory was that he had already
rescinded by restoring the consideration to the defendant. This
needed no court intervention and the rescission was complete.
Hence, he could sue in "law" on the original tort. But if he had not
restored the consideration or offered to do so, then there had been no
"rescission at law" and the release was still valid to bar his claim.
This is partly based on pure theory of rescission at law, that the
parties rescind without court intervention, and partly based on the
assumption that, if the plaintiff were permitted to proceed, he would
be unjustly enriched because the law court could not deduct the
202 See RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 65 (1937); Immel, The Require-
nent of Restoration in the Avoidance of Releases of Tort Clains, 31 NOTRE
DAME LAw. 629 (1956). A number of cases are collected in Annot., 134
A.L.R. 6 (1941).203 Ibid.
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settlement money from the ultimate judgment or render a conditional
judgment. But today procedure is not so rigid, and courts fre--
quently do permit a plaintiff to recover and then deduct from the
verdict the amount paid in settlement. Hence, today, even at law,
plaintiff is not unjustly enriched, and the older views which made a
rigid separation of law and equity for this purpose seem quite
anachronistic and unneeded.2"4 If the suit was in equity the theory
was different. The theory was, not that the plaintiff had already
rescinded, but rather that he was asking the equity court to cancel
the release for him. Until the release was cancelled or rescinded,
there was no need to restore any consideration and the equity court
could require restoration as a condition of relief. This would avoid
unjust enrichment, so that generally in equity, where the action was
solely to rescind the release, no tender was required. 0 5
If the basis of the rule requiring tender is to prevent unjust
enrichment then there is no reason to require tender today, since
unjust enrichment of the plaintiff may be prevented in equity by a
conditional decree or in law by deducting the settlement money from
the plaintiff's verdict if he gets one.2" 6 For this reason, presumably,
the Restatement of Restitution excepts the plaintiff from the tender
requirement if the consideration "consists of money which can be
credited if restitution is granted."207  In most jurisdictions such a
credit should be possible28 and since most releases do involve money
payments, this exception, if followed, should operate in the majority
of cases to relieve the plaintiff of any tender as a prerequisite to his
action for relief, whether it is in law or equity. Courts have relieved
plaintiffs of the tender requirement in a good many situations, as
where the plaintiff has spent the money, or finds restoration im-
possible, or where tender would have been refused by the defendant
in any event, or where there was fraud in the execution, or in some
cases where there was any kind of fraud at all.209 Plaintiff therefore
"'Cf. In re Meiselman, 105 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1939).
... See Immel, supra note 202.
... Arguably this might be different where consideration for the release
is not money but something not capable of valuation.I"1 RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 65(f) (1937).
20 Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Gill, 227 F.2d 64 (4th Cir. 1958) (refusing
to deduct consideration on the ground that jury had already done so); Preddy
v. Britt, 212 N.C. 719, 194 S.E. 494 (1938) (deducting release consideration
from jury's verdict).
.00 See authorities cited note 202 supra. A succinct and useful statement
of many exceptions is found in Note, 11 U. FLA. L. Ev. 362, 369-70 (1958).
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has an effective collection of shields to fend off any claim that he
must fail for lack of tender; and of course he should use them all,
since tender is still a theoretical requirement in most jurisdictions
when the action is "at law" and failure of tender may cost the
plaintiff his relief.21 °
But all this assumes that prevention of unjust enrichment is the
only reason for the tender requirement. Sometimes it is suggested
that there are other reasons. For example, it is said that the tender
requirement may operate to discourage plaintiffs from attacking
releases too readily, and that the requirement should be maintained
on that ground,211 even though the original theory behind it has no
application. This argument assumes that plaintiffs will recoil at the
first obstacle thrown in their paths-a proposition that hardly seems
demonstrable in view of the successful plaintiff attacks on other
rules that have not suited them. Thus there may be some doubt
whether the tender requirement really discourages plaintiffs from
seeking relief, especially since they have a good chance of coming
within some exception. Furthermore, it would be grossly unfair
to prevent relief which a plaintiff deserves otherwise, merely because
he innocently spent the money paid for the release and cannot return
it.
However, though a tender requirement may not discourage plain-
tiffs, they may be encouraged by the fact that, if no tender is required,
they can risk nothing to gain much. This is perhaps what is really
objectionable and this is the thing that may encourage undue attacks
on the finality of settlements. But the tender requirement is a poor
way to meet this objection. For one thing, a plaintiff knows very
well that his tender will almost always be rejected. When it is, he
may safely proceed with his attack on the settlement without further
risk. If he loses, he still has his settlement; if he wins, he may obtain
additional compensation without any risk. Some other way needs
to be found to meet this problem, for the tender requirement does
not do so. A practical way to meet it would be to permit either a
Some statutes also relieve plaintiff of the tender requirement, e.g., N.Y. R.
Civ. PRAc. § 3004. See the discussion in Patterson, Improvements in the
Law of Restitution, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 667 (1955). The possibility, in fraud
cases, of affirming the release and suing for deceit is discussed in the text
accompanying note 72 supra. If this is permitted, no tender is necessary.
210 See Havinghurst, Problems Concerning Settlement Agreements, 53 Nw.
U.L. REv. 283, 311 (1958).
..1 See Havinghurst, supra note 210, at 312; Immel, supra note 202, at 632.
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civil fine or all actual costs of defendant (not merely "court costs")
to be levied against a losing plaintiff, who brings action for relief
on clearly inadequate grounds. This should discourage the plaintiff
who wishes to try his luck without any real basis for his action. But
it would not penalize the plaintiff who has an honest claim nor pre-
vent relief if he cannot make a tender.
Quantum of Proof
It is frequently said that a release will not be set aside for fraud
or mistake unless the person attacking the release can prove the in-
validity by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence or some similar
quantum of proof.2 12 It is doubtful whether such a rule means much,
if anything, to juries,21 since they have very little with which to
compare the evidence, and probably are unable to distinguish the
difference-if there is one-between preponderance of the evidence
and clear and convincing proof. But if the standards mean nothing
to juries, judges believe that they can discern a difference between
evidence that preponderates and that which is clear and convincing,
and plaintiffs sometimes lose cases because courts make such dis-
tinctions. 1 4
Other jurisdictions use the ordinary preponderance standard for
proof, eschewing the special "clear and convincing" requirement al-
together. 21 5  An interesting variation is the requirement of clear
and convincing proof where the action is to reform a release, but
the requirement of preponderance of the evidence when the action
is to set the instrument aside.216
So far as juries are concerned, any extra proof requirement in
these cases probably makes no difference. Yet it does seem desirable
to call attention to the policies favoring finality of settlement in some
way, and the requirement of clear and convincing evidence probably
"
12Reinhardt v. Wilbur, 30 N.J. Super. 502, 105 A.2d 415 (App. Div.
!954) (mistake); Campbell v. Campbell, - W.Va. -, 124 S.:E.2d 345 (1962)
(fraud).
21' See Note, 1959 Wis. L. REv. 525. Testing mock juries, the authors
found that jurors were unable to distinguish the standards and in any event
did not apply them.
214 See cases cited note 212 supra.
"' The federal courts, following a hint in Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342
U.S. 359 (1952), seem to agree that the quantum of proof required is merely
a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Allison v. Chicago Great W. Ry.,
240 Minn. 547, 62 N.W.2d 374 (1954).
2.. Maynard v. Durham & So. Ry., 251 N.C. 783, 112 S.E.2d 249 (1960),
rev'd on other grounds, 365 U.S. 160 (1961).
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does suggest to judges, though not juries, that an attack on a final
settlement is not something to be accepted lightly. That does not
mean that any formal standard of proof is the way to emphasize the
policy problem, however. Judges can, like the rest of us, slip all too
easily off into a mechanical repetition of the proof standard without
necessarily considering the policies involved at all. Perhaps, then, the
additional burden placed on plaintiffs in some jurisdictions does not
really serve a good purpose, except to permit judges, under the
guise of measuring the standard of proof, to decide the matter for
themselves-that is, to avoid the effect of jury verdicts. Perhaps
this device to avoid jury decision is desirable, since juries are not
really qualified to judge the policy factors involved; but at best it
can only assist the judge, and when a jury is charged as to a special
standard of proof, confusion ensues without profit. It may be better
to find another and more straightforward way to eliminate juries
from consideration of policy questions involved in release cases and
to eliminate the special proof standards altogether.
VI. SOME SUGGESTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Juries
Various factors are used in deciding whether relief should be
granted for "mistake." The mere fact of mistake itself is not de-
cisive. Who looks at all the factors that should be considered?
Who examines the policies of finality and justice? Is it judge or
jury? In most jurisdictions the plaintiff simply files his law suit as
if a release had never been given. Defendant pleads the release
in defense. The case then proceeds to trial, usually a jury trial.
The jury decides (a) the liability issue, i.e., whether defendant
was at fault, and (b) the release-validity issue, i.e., whether the
mistake, fraud, or duress was the kind that will permit relief. Under
this procedure it is obvious that the jury is permitted to decide a
complex matter of policy-should the needs of justice outweigh
the needs of finality? It is equally obvious that they cannot be in-
structed feasibly on all the factors to be considered, and that they
are not equipped by training, experience, expert testimony, or judicial
instruction to make such policy decisions. Juries often, of course, do
make policy decisions. When a jury decides that defendant's con-
duct was negligent, it is really evaluating his conduct and deciding
whether it is of the kind the community permits or should permit.
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For such decisions jurors are exceptionally well equipped. But for
the decision on whether the whole system of settlement should afford
finality in a particular case, jurors are usually quite unqualified.
Only a judge should make such decisions. This, of course, is what
frequently happens-judges take cases away from juries on the
ground that "as a matter of law" the mistake involved is not sufficient
to justify relief. But that is not the same thing in all cases as the
judge deciding for himself. This is especially obvious on the
appellate level. Judges in appellate courts do not hear and see wit-
nesses. And they can only decide that the case is not one for the
jury to decide. Trial judges need to have a bigger hand in such
decisions. They should decide whether relief is to be granted on
the basis of all the factors that are relevant to the conflicting policies
involved.
Unfortunately, the jury systems of most states cannot easily be
changed in this respect. However, in many states it is possible to
have separate trials of the two basic parts of the case-of the release-
validity issue and of the liability issue. The first trial may be by a
judge sitting without a jury and may deal solely with the release
question-whether it is valid. If it is not valid, then the second
trial may be held in which the release need not be mentioned and a
jury will decide the issue of whether the defendant was at fault.
Separate trials have disadvantages in many cases. For example,
there may be a duplication of proof, for plaintiff will have to show, in
the trial on the release-validity, that he was seriously injured; if he
does not, there will be little or no justification for avoiding the
release. He will then have to show proof of injury again to the jury.
But though there is some duplication, it is probably counterbalanced
by cases where a single trial on the release issue will terminate in
favor of the defendant, thus avoiding the necessity for the expense of
a jury and a full scale trial on the liability issue.
No one can say in advance that all release cases ought to have
the issues severed in this manner, and in some jurisdictions it would
not be possible to do so because of a jury trial requirement even on
"equitable" issues. But, where severance is possible, the trial judge
should recognize that the jury is not really an appropriate judge of
the policies involved in release cases. In the light of that considera-
tion, severance would seem appropriate in most cases.
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Civil Fines
A civil fine, or imposition upon the plaintiff of a charge equal
to all or part of defendant's actual costs in defending an unwarranted,
claim for relief would be an appropriate substitute for the outmoded
and unworkable requirement that plaintiff restore, or offer to restore,
the consideration obtained under the release. A statute imposing
such potential liability upon a plaintiff would do more to discourage
unreasonable demands than anything else. It might be expected to
do much to preserve or increase the finality of settlement, while at
the same time permitting relief where it is appropriate. Under such
a statute a plaintiff who obtained 500 dollars under a release and
proved only 1,000 dollars in damages should be denied relief, and
also, in the discretion of the trial judge, be required to pay de-
fendant's expenses in defending the suit. Of course, such a statute,
if passed, ought not to be invoked against a plaintiff who has any
reason to hope for relief. If he merely mis-estimates his chances of
winning, he need not be penalized. The point of the statute would
be to force him to make a careful estimate and to eliminate the
something-for-nothing situation that is now possible. It would be
hoped that such a statute would never be applied, for if it worked it
would eliminate unreasonable claims rather than merely punish those
who have already made them. In order to assure that the plaintift
himself is aware of the risks he takes when he seeks to re-open a
released claim, such a statute should require the defendant, if he
wishes to take advantage of the statute, to serve notice of the
potential claim upon the plantiff personally.
The trial judge in most states can undoubtedly be relied upon
to apply such a rule wisely and without oppression against a plaintiff
who has already suffered a serious loss. If so, the rules for tender
and restoration with their attendant complications and exceptions
could be avoided and a workable way to discourage unfair attacks
on releases substituted.
Time Limitations
A release is one form of settling a legal dispute. A judgment is
another form of doing the same. A judgment is one of the most final
and certain documents known to the law, yet it may be set aside, at
least for "extrinsic" mistakes. Many statutes permitting this relief
from unfair judgments recognize that the most important element in-
volved is time. Once an appropriate mistake is found, relief is left
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largely to the discretion of the trial judge-provided only that relief is
sought within a given period of time after the judgment was entered.
Time is likewise an important factor in deciding whether a release is
to be set aside. Perhaps, however, it should be more important. It
would seem appropriate by statutory rule to require the plaintiff to
bring his action within one year (or some other specified period)
after execution of the release. This would work hardship on very
few plaintiffs, for most mistakes can be discovered within a year.
The plaintiff ought to be barred absolutely (on mistake grounds)
after the one year period, because of the danger that testimony will
be lost and that unprovable prejudice to the defendant will arise.
This should be so even though the original statute of limitations on
the merits has not yet run. But the other side of the coin is that, if
plaintiff brings his action within the one year period after the execu-
tion of the release, the decision on the issue whether he can avoid
the release or not should be largely within the discretion of the trial
judge. Of course, the plaintiff ought to prove the mistake and that
it was serious, and the trial judge ought to consider all the factors
discussed above. But, as in the case of relief from judgments, the
question should be primarily addressed to the trial judge's discretion.
If such a statute were adopted, a good many complex and unnecessary
rules could be eliminated. But at the same time, much certainty
would be introduced by requiring the plaintiff to bring his action
within one year of the release, when mistake is asserted as grounds
for rescission of the release.
Conclusion
The focus of attention in cases where the plaintiff attacks a release
for mistake or fraud is often in the wrong place. In the fraud cases
the only question is: did the defendant or his agent commit any un-
conscionable act? If so, we need not inquire whether the act amounts
to actionable fraud or even the kind that would merit equitable relief.
He should not be permitted to minimize the tort liability imposed
on him by law by any but the most scrupulous conduct. Concern
over "misrepresentations of law" or over "opinion" is out of place.
It is enough if the plaintiff executed the release in reliance on some
unfair statement or concealment or because of some unfair conduct.
In the mistake cases the focus of attention has sometimes gone even
further afield from the real problems. Vision is often concentrated
on sterile rules that are not based upon the needs involved, the need
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for finality and the need to hold the tortfeasor to his tort. Noth-
ing could be less important in answering these problems than
the spurious issue whether the plaintiff made a mistake in prognosis
or diagnosis, in fact or prediction, or whether he offered to restore
the consideration received. Even the fundamental theory of relief,
the old contract term, "mutual mistake," is itself out of place, and in
fact has little to do with relief granted in release cases. In the end
the law can be simplified and improved by eliminating these catch
phrases and beginning each case with an inquiry into the policies of
finality and fairness. Beyond that, a study of the factors indicated
above as applied to the particular case should be of some assistance.
The application of sense, experience, and good will may avoid many
of the pitfalls. There can be in these cases little certainty or pre-
dictability-probably no more than as to what amounts to negligence
or contributory negligence. But there can be some rational basis
for decision, and that would be progress. And perhaps statutory
changes along the lines of those suggested above would provide addi-
tional certainty as well.
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